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ABSTRACT

Confronting persistent and widening inequality in educational
opportunity, advocates have regarded the right to education as a linchpin
for reform. In the forty years since the Supreme Court relegatedthat right
to the domain of state constitutionallaw, its power has surged andfaded in
litigation challenging state school finance systems. Like so many of the
students it is meant to protect, however, the right to education has
generally underachieved, in part because those wielding it have not always
appreciatedits distinctiveforms andfunction.
Deconstructed, the right to education held by children has been
formulated doctrinally as both a claim-right, imposing affirmative duties
on the state to act, and an immunity, disabling certain state action. These
two strands-oft-manifestedas the claim-right to educational "adequacy"
and an immunity entailing "equality" of educational opportunity-once
considered irreconcilable, are actually interlocked by the right's core
historicalfunction to protect children's liberty and equality interests.
And yet the right to education is ill equipped to fulfill its protection
function. Education clauses in state constitutions do not fix the standards
for mutually enforcing equality and adequacy. This encumbers alreadyreluctant courts in addressing educational disparities and emboldens
legislative resistance when they do. Appreciating that the right to education
has a protection function entailing equality and liberty interests
nevertheless suggests that the right can be adjudicatedin a way that unifies
the demands and guarantees of substantive due process and equal
protection. That union holds the potential to ameliorate the enforcement
standards thereby reconstituting the right to education as a mainstay of
reform.
INTRODUCTION

The right to education is a constitutional aberration. Whittled by a 5-4
Supreme Court majority in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez-as nonfundamental, ostensibly without rank in the U.S.
Constitution'-the right persists explicitly in state constitutions. There it
has been conscripted in the service of school finance litigation initiated in
nearly every state but has failed to usher in the lasting reforms sought by
advocates.2 Rather, the fallout from the 1973 Rodriguez opinion has been

1. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
2. See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutionswith Equal Protection: The First
Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1343, 1360-73
(2010) (recounting successes and failures of school finance cases in state courts).
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so desultory that this once-nascent entitlement appears somewhat of an
ugly duckling of constitutional rights-stuck, alas, in a forty-year-plus ugly
phase. The prospect that the right to education will mature into a proverbial
swan is dim, and yet, for many it remains an irresistible vision.
Scholars have imagined various transformations of the right to advance
its constitutional station.3 Some propose petitioning the Court to overrule
Rodriguez and recognize a fundamental right to "equal educational
opportunity," implicating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.4 They insist that such a conversion is not as improbable as it seems
given the federal government's increased role in education since Rodriguez
and the Court's subsequent precedent.
Others suggest that the Court should, if not overrule, at least revisit
Rodriguez because it did not properly consider alternative bases for the
right, e.g., the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, the implied right to
vote, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses;6 the Citizenship Clause;7 or the Ninth Amendment. 8
Perhaps unconvinced that courts will rely on any of these sources to
find the right implicit in the text, "groups of scholars, advocates, legal
institutions, and communities have been theorizing and organizing a
grassroots movement to amend the Constitution" to make the right

3. See id. at 1378-82 (reviewing previously proposed strategies for establishing a right to
education in the U.S. Constitution).
4. Christopher R. Lockard, Note, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and
Future of Education Finance Litigation in California, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 420-21 (2005-2006)
(noting Berkeley Law professors' "Rethinking Rodriguez" project, which considered "mounting a
school finance lawsuit based on federal constitutional rights with the hope of overruling
Rodriguez ... to make education a fundamental right" (footnote omitted)); cf Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. I1 l, 121-23 (2004) (concluding that
Rodriguez was "tragically wrong").
5. See, e.g., Sarah G. Boyce, Note, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake
of the Federal Government's Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 DuKE L.J. 1025 (2012); Kerry P.
Burnet, Note, Never a Lost Cause: Evaluating School Finance Litigation in the Face of Continuing

Education Inequality in Post-Rodriguez America, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225; see also Black, supra note
2, at 1361, 1406 (contending that Rodriguez need not be overruled directly because state education
cases have "broaden[ed] the concept of equity to include a substantive component" such that federal
equal protection is implicated when states provide one set of students an adequate education but deny it
to others).
6.

See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundationsfor a Right to Education Under the U.S

Constitution:A Beginning to the End of the NationalEducation Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 553
(1992).
7. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 330,
394 (2006); see also Kara A. Millonzi, Education as a Right of National Citizenship Under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1286, 1288 (2003)
("Because the early history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause indicates that the clause was
designed to protect rights of national citizenship, the clause is potentially a more appropriate
constitutional source for protecting the right to education than the Equal Protection Clause." (footnote
omitted)).
8.

See DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 153 (2007).
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explicit. 9 Most other commentators nevertheless encourage a more modest
approach, to take what Rodriguez gives (by leaving undecided)-the
possibility of a federal constitutional right to a "minimally adequate
education."o Still others think that the solution is for Congress to bypass
Rodriguez and the U.S. Constitution altogether and enact a federal statutory
right to education."
An intensifying minority of scholars caution against federalizing the
right to education12 or are resigned to working within the state
constitutional framework, from which nearly all of the right's jurisprudence
has evolved in the four decades since Rodriguez.13 Scott Bauries, for
9. See Black, supra note 2, at 1381 (citing campaigns to amend U.S. Constitution).
10. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 (suggesting possibility that "some identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [First Amendment
freedoms and the right to vote]"); see, e.g., Julius Chambers, Adequate Educationfor All: A Right, an
Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 67-72 (1987); Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez
Revisited: ConstitutionalTheory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475, 480 (1998); Barry Friedman
& Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013);
Thomas J. Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right Under the United States Constitution, 29

WILLAMETTE L. REv. 279, 281-87 (1993); Matthew A. Brunell, Note, What Lawrence Brought for
"Show and Tell": The Non-FundamentalLiberty Interest in a Minimally Adequate Education, 25 B.C.

THIRD WORLD L.J. 343 (2005); Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance
Litigation: Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1016

(2010); Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Educationas a FundamentalRight: Challenging the Supreme Court's
Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953 (1998); cf Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive
Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 47 (2012) (advocating statutory and
constitutional bases for a "right to comprehensive educational opportunity" in the No Child Left Behind
Act and in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, including the adequacy issue left open in
Rodriguez).

11. See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., Keynote Address, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 151 (2008) (calling
for new academic approach to educational rights as fundamental civil rights, focusing on
subconstitutional statutory means of rights definition, establishment, and enforcement); Kimberly
Jenkins Robinson, The Casefor a CollaborativeEnforcement Modelfor a FederalRight to Education,

40 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1653, 1712-16 (2007) (urging Congress to recognize federal right to education,
enact it through spending legislation, and enforce it by federal panel); see also Derek W. Black, The
CongressionalFailure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education

Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 321 (2010) (proposing modification of Title I's funding to remedy inequitable
disparities in educational funding and "restore the federal government to its proper role as a leader in
education equality").
12. See Black, supra note 2, at 1384-85 (citing Paul L. Tractenberg, The Refusal To "Federalize"
the Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity, the Role of State Courts and the Impact of Different State
Constitutional Theories 30 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
tranctenberg_paper.pdf, Daniel S. Greenspahn, A ConstitutionalRight to Learn: The Uncertain Allure
ofMaking a FederalCase out ofEducation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 772 (2008)).
13. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School FinanceReform, 48
VAND. L. REv. 101, 108-09 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School FinanceLitigation, and
the "Third Wave ": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995); Allen W. Hubsch, The

Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325 (1992); Robert
M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC.

& L.J. 1; Molly McUsic, The Use of EducationClauses in School FinanceReform Litigation, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIs. 307, 308-17 (1991); Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State
ConstitutionalImperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (2009); William E. Thro, The Role ofLanguage ofthe
State Education Clauses in School FinanceLitigation, 79 WEST's EDuc. L. REP. 19 (1993); Deborah A.
Verstegen, Towards a Theory ofAdequacy: The ContinuingSaga ofEqual EducationalOpportunity in
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instance, analyzes the nature of the "right" to education under state
constitutions, examining how it diverges or converges with federal
doctrinel 4 and prescribing principles for its adjudication."
Yet even "the state constitutional right to education is in danger of
being rendered meaningless" due to lingering doubts about its justiciability
and the increasing reluctance of courts to order remediation in the face of
legislative deficiencies or outright defiance.' 6 School funding cases have
long been laden with separation of powers concerns, causing some courts
to abdicate their role entirely. Other courts previously willing to intervene
have begun to demur, faced with the prospect of enforcing the right in ways
that might continuously encroach on legislative prerogatives. 7
Hence, despite decades of school funding litigation and the vast
literature annotated above, the right to education remains conceptually
fragmented. I do not wish to add another voice to this dissonant chorus by
attempting to blueprint an entirely new edifice for the right. Rather, in this
Article I deconstruct the right's present, much-maligned composition to
gain clarity about the legal architectures that have already been conceived
and operationalized. In so doing, I show how two strands of the right to
education once thought to be diametrically opposed-equality of
educational opportunity and educational adequacy-are interlocked
through the right's forms and functions.
In Part I, I evaluate the right to education's forms-privilege, claimright, power, and immunity-within Hohfeld's analytic scheme of rights.' 8

the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School Finance Systems, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 499 (2004); Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting "Adequacy" in State Constitutions'

Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 (2003); see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and
State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138, 1168

(1999).
14. See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REv. 701, 741 (2010)
[hereinafter Bauries, Judicial Review ofAdequacy]; Scott R. Bauries, State ConstitutionsandIndividual
Rights: Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 301 (2011)
[hereinafter Bauries, Conceptual Convergence].
15.

See Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalismfor the Right to Education, 48 GA.

L. REv. 949 (2014) [hereinafter Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism]; Scott R. Bauries, The
EducationDuty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 736 (2012) [hereinafter Bauries, EducationDuty].
16. Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciabilityand the Role of Courts in Adequacy
Litigation: Preservingthe ConstitutionalRight to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 87 (2010).
17. Id. at 96-97.
18. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). These two articles were later
combined in a book following Hohfeld's death. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919)
[hereinafter HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS].
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Hohfeld's framework is ubiquitous,' 9 "the 'standard model' of legal
rights," 2 0 and renowned as "a canonical landmark in American
jurisprudence." 2 1 Although Hohfeld is not without his critics, 22 his scheme
"has withstood the test of time."23 More importantly, some courts have
utilized Hohfeld's framework for analyzing legal rights 24-including,
significantly, two state supreme courts, which did so explicitly in
interpreting their state constitutions' education clauses.2 5
Coding the right to education's forms only reveals part of its nature,
however. 2 6 The form provides a descriptor of the right's "internal
structure." 27 But to fit our ordinary understanding of what it means to have
a legal right, we also need a descriptor of "what rights do for those who
hold them," i.e., their function.2 8 Leif Wenar identifies six functionsexemption, discretion, authorization, provision, performance, and
19.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 306 ("Numerous articles and books

have employed Hohfeld's framework since it was first introduced.").
20.

Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution-the Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-

Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REv. 793, 800-01 (1998) (observing that Hohfeld's
framework "was adopted by various Restatements of the Law, as well as by Black's Law Dictionary");
see Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND's Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing

Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 289 (2014) (observing that Hohfeld's "hundred-year-old article is so
widely read and referenced that it landed a spot at number fifty in Shapiro and Pearse's recent study
ranking the one hundred most-cited law review articles").

21.

Allen Thomas O'Rourke, Refuge from a Jurisprudenceof Doubt: Hohfeldian Analysis of

ConstitutionalLaw, 61 S.C. L. REv. 141, 144 (2009); see HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 59

(1994) ("The beginning of wisdom [on contemporary discussions of rights] is widely agreed to be the
classification of juridical positions developed by Wesley N. Hohfeld."); Matthew H. Kramer, Rights in
Legal and PoliticalPhilosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 414, 415 (Keith E.

Whittington et al. eds., 2008) ("The most famous and influential analysis of legal rights ever
propounded is that developed by the American jurist Wesley Hohfeld . . . .").
22.
See Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 7, 7 n.1 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 1998) (citing criticisms); Joseph

William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982
Wis. L. REv. 975, 989-93, 989 n.22 (describing central criticisms and legal rights debates spurred in
response to Hohfeld's framework).
23.

See Kramer, supra note 21, at 417.

24. See, e.g., Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 280 n.l (3d Cir. 2008); United States ex
rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equip., Inc., 89 F.3d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogatedby
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010); Cal. Grocers Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.3d 1019, 1033
n.10 (Cal. 2011); State v. Goldberg, 85 A.3d 231, 243-44, 243 n.17 (Md. 2014); Yu v. Paperchase
P'ship, 845 P.2d 158, 163-65 (N.M. 1992).
25. See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527 n.23 (Mass. 1993)
("[I]f legislatures and magistrates have a constitutional duty to educate, then members of the
Commonwealth have a correlative constitutional right to be educated." (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978) ("Flowing from this
constitutionally imposed 'duty' [to make ample provision for education] is its jural correlative, a
correspondent 'right' permitting control of another's conduct." (footnote omitted)).

26.

And fortunately Bauries has laid much of that groundwork. See Bauries, Conceptual

Convergence, supranote 14, at 306-21.
27.

Leif

Wenar,

Rights,

STAN.

ENCYCLOPEDIA

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall201 1/entries/rights.
28. Id.

OF

PHIL.

(July

2,

2011),
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protection-which, when paired with one or more forms, provide a
complete description of the right's "complex 'molecular' . . . structure." 29
The practical implications of this description are quite serious because
the right's forms and functions dictate the scope of judicial review and the
remedial measures that courts can undertake. Put simply, they predetermine
the right's potential strength and viability.
My analysis in Part I concludes that the right to education held by
children has taken the form of both a claim-right and an immunity. Where
the two forms overlap-the protection function-the claim-right denotes a
right to educational adequacy, and the immunity is one of equality of
educational opportunity.30 Although the protection function has not
attracted much scholarly attention, the right has long been justified and
invoked to protect children from political, economic, and social inequalities
and more generally to protect their capabilities to be responsible,
productive citizens.
Broadly construed, such equality and liberty interests are underwritten
by the equality and adequacy principles I explore further in Part II. At the
core of the principle of educational adequacy is the notion that we must
cultivate children's positive liberties. Whereas the distributive principle of
equality of educational opportunity has been utilized to negate resource
inequities and social inequalities. Despite the potential of adequacy and
equality intertwined, 31 education clauses in state constitutions do not fix
standards for their mutual enforcement, leaving the right to education
vulnerable to the charge that it is judicially unmanageable.
Disjoined, equal protection and substantive due process offer little
recourse, each being jurisprudentially flawed: equal protection demanding
substantive equality poses its own intractable manageability problems,
rendering it inadequate. Substantive due process, as a noncomparative
right, tolerates and potentially exasperates, objectionable inequities.
Conjoined, the egalitarian principles of equal protection and the substantive
demands of due process might overcome these flaws, but exactly how they
can be integrated remains unclear, even after the Court's recent application
in Obergefell v. Hodges.32
I make no pretense that a grand unifying theory is viable or even
desirable. Nevertheless, the right to education-an immunity-claim-right
imparting a protection function vis-i-vis children's liberty and equality
29. LeifWenar, The Nature ofRights, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (2005).
30. "Equality of educational opportunity has been thought to require equal spending per pupil or
spending adjusted to the needs of differently situated children. Adequacy has been understood to require
a level of spending sufficient to satisfy some absolute, rather than relative, educational threshold."
Joshua E. Weishart, TranscendingEquality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REv. 477, 477 (2014).
31. See generally id.
32. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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interests-presents a configuration that could make unifying substantive
due process and equal protection more palpable. That union could, in turn,
ameliorate the standards for enforcing the right to education. On the one
hand, substantive due process advancing positive liberty interests reinforces
the adequacy threshold from which resource inequities can be judicially
measured and adjusted; on the other hand, equal protection can infuse equal
educational opportunity principles in translating adequacy as a relational
demand.
I. THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION'S "MOLECULAR STRUCTURE"

In human rights discourse, the right to education is a Johnny-comelately. Although the right formally arrived on the international scene in
1948 via the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),34 it was
consigned with other so-called "second-generation" human rightseconomic, social, and cultural rights-behind "first-generation" political
and civil rights. In the course of a few decades, however, human rights
discourse has gradually expanded to include second-generation rights. 6
And the right to education figures prominently in that discussion. In fact,
"[t]he right to education is the most widely enshrined [socio-economic
right], present in more than three-quarters of the world's constitutions." 38
Notwithstanding the burgeoning human rights discourse, the Supreme
Court has observed that the UDHR is nonbinding,39 and the United States is
among the few industrialized nations that failed to ratify the two treaties
that explicitly recognize a right to education, the International Covenant on
33.

See generally Leah K. McMillan, What's in a Right? Two Variationsfor Interpreting the

Right to Education, 56 INT'L REV. EDUC. 531 (2010).

&

34.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 26(1) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.").
35.
See J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization:
InternationalMechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Strugglefor Peoples'Rights in Africa, 18 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 851, 852-55 (2003) (explaining that second-generation rights "have been relegated to a
lower[,] less important sphere" and "are as much marginalized in the discourse[] as they are in the
enforcement").
36. See id. at 854; Nisha Thapliyal et al., "Until We Get Up Again to Fight": Education Rights
and Participationin South Africa, 57 CoMP. EDUC. REV. 212, 213 (2013).
37. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE (Yvonne Donders
Vladimir Volodin eds., 2007); JOEL SPRING, THE UNIVERSAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: JUSTIFICATION,
DEFINITION, AND GUIDELINES (2000).
38. Courtney Jung et al., Economic and Social Rights in NationalConstitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP.
L. 1043, 1053 (2014); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education para.
66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/52 (Jan. 11, 2001) (observing explicit guarantees of right to education in
142 of 186 countries surveyed).
39. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) ("[T]he Declaration does not of its
own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.").
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child. 4 0 Even if customary international law yet obligates the United
States to discern and enforce a right to education,4 1 that recognition would
not give the right any "constitutional stature"-the right "would merely
become federal law[,] which could be superseded by subsequent
contradictory federal legislation or treaty law." 42 Hence, although the
development of the international human right to education can inform our
analysis, it cannot dictate the scope of this domestic, constitutional-level
inquiry.
As previously noted, there is no dearth of scholarship formulating the
right to education under American law. Indeed, rights-based "claims about
education reform enjoy a resurgence in [our] political discourse."a' Yet,
"current scholarship has mostly produced very general descriptions of
education rights, but little critical analysis of whether these general
conceptions are logically sound or normatively desirable."" Rather than
query the nature of the right itself, much of the literature assumes it is a
"positive right" and focuses on its "quantitative and qualitative
entitlements" or its enforcement, that is, its "justiciability and
remediability."4 5 A conceptually thin account of the right, however, further
obscures its content and complicates problems with its enforcement.4 6
Although Bauries has made significant inroads to fill this "theoretical
void,"a I reconsider his account of the right to education's forms and
venture further, to chart the right's functions. Together, the forms and
functions provide a complete picture of the right's structure.
A.

The Right to Education'sForms

Although Hohfeld aimed to clarify and, in a sense, simplify the term
8
"right," his scheme of rights is quite intricate. 4 Generations of scholars

40.

See Angela Avis Holland, Note, Resolving the Dissonance of Rodriguez and the Right to

Education: InternationalHuman Rights Instruments as a Source of Repose for the United States, 41

VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 229, 245-50 (2008).
41. Seeidat254.
42. Bitensky, supra note 6, at 618-19.
43.

ANNE NEWMAN, REALIZING EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS 60 (2013).

44. Bauries, Judicial Review of Adequacy, supra note 14, at 755-56; see id. at 758 & n.274
(citing "a few notable exceptions").
45.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 303-04.

46. Cf id. at 304 ("[B]oth scholarship and adjudication of education rights and responsibilities
would be improved by a better understanding of which conceptions are actually at work in the cases.").
47. See generallyBauries, JudicialReview ofAdequacy, supranote 14.
48.

See GEORGE W. RAINBOLT, THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS 11-17 (2006); Eric Engle, Taking the

Right Seriously: Hohfeldian Semiotics and Rights Discourse, 3 CRIT 84, 95 (2010) ("Hohfeld proposes
a potentially infinite and, in all events, complex typology."). For a sophisticated treatment of
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have sought to recapitulate or refine his taxonomy. Because this ground has
been covered numerous times before, we can forgo a lengthy discussion of
the framework in the abstract; an abridged review of the Hohfeldian
lexicon should facilitate a basic understanding of how courts have
understood the right to education's forms in practice.
When we use the word "right" in a legal sense, we may have in mind
one (or more) of four distinct entitlements: (1) claim-right, (2) privilege, (3)
power, or (4) immunity. 49 Each of these four "Hohfeldian incidents" has a
"jural correlative," which together comprise a legal relationship between
two or more parties.50 So, for instance, if Emma has a claim-right to
education against the state, then the state has a jural correlative duty to
Emma to educate her. If, however, Emma holds a privilege against the state
regarding her education, then the state has a correlative no-right to interfere
with Emma's education (and indeed, Emma has no duty to the state even to
be educated). The claim-right and privilege are "first-order" rights in that
they are rights one has "over objects such as one's body." 5
Powers and immunities are "second-order" (read higher order),
considered "[r]ights over rights."s2 That is, they describe "the various ways
in which people [or entities] can manipulate the first-order [rights]." 53 If the
state holds a power, it is authorized to create, waive, or annul its own
claim-right or privilege or Emma's claim-right or privilege, and thus,
Emma is under a correlative liability to the state's power. 5 4 However, if
Emma holds an immunity, then the state is under a correlative disability,

Hohfeldian relations as a basis for deontic logic, see Kevin W. Saunders, A Formal Analysis of
HohfeldianRelations, 23 AKRON L. REV. 465 (1990).
49. Scholars have taken issue with Hohfeld's terminology. Some prefer the term "liberty" instead
of "privilege," see, e.g., Glanville Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1129,
1131-35 (1956), and "claim-right" or "claim" instead of "right," see, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel
Bahls, The Public'sRight to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the "FaredUse" Fallacy, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 619, 625 n.26 ("[C]ommentators tend to use the phrase 'claim right' .. . to preserve the
simple term 'right,' with its rich connotative range, for more general applicability."); O'Rourke, supra
note 21, at 145 n.27 (using "claim" as distinct from the "broader, popular usage" of "right"). To avoid
confusion, I employ the terms used by both Bauries and Wenar.
50. To simplify matters further, we can omit a discussion of the "jural opposites," which are
merely negations of the four Hohfeldian incidents. The opposites are "inessential"-the Hohfeldian
incidents and their correlatives "cover all the conceptual material" needed to elucidate the right to
education's forms. Cf Frank 1. Michelman, "There Have To Be Four", 64 MD. L. REV. 136, 156
(2005).
51. Wenar, supra note 29, at 233. Claim-rights and privileges form what H.L.A. Hart referred to
as "primary rules"-rules requiring people "to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to
or not." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (3d ed. 2012).
52. Wenar, supranote 29, at 233.

53. Rowan Cruft, Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?, 23 LAW & PHIL. 347, 350
(2004). Following Hart, powers and immunities are thus "secondary rules" because they allow people to
"introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine
their incidence or control their operations." HART, supra note 51, at 81.
54. See Cruft, supra note 53, at 350-51.
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and thus, the state has no power to create, waive, or annul its own claimright or privilege or Emma's claim-right or privilege." In short, secondorder rights either allow or disallow a party to change her own or another
party's legal relations.
Table A. Hohfeld's Jural Correlatives.
First-order
A's claim-right *-+ B's duty

A's privilege ++ B's no-right
5 Second-order
A's power *-+ B's liability
A's immunity <-+ B's disability

Until recently, commentators had been reluctant to describe Hohfeld's
Jural Correlatives in the context of a constitutional-level right and the legal
relationship the right establishes between citizen and state.5 6 That is
because "Hohfeld developed his framework to describe private legal
relationships, and the Hohfeld system has, during most of its existence,
been applied solely to private law questions," e.g., property, contracts,
torts.s7 But several scholars have now demonstrated that the framework can
be applied to public law questions as well." Moreover, earlier criticism that
the framework could not account for the correlativity between public law
duties and rights 5 9 has been effectively rebutted. The criticism "is plainly
wrong if the constitutional status of the state as a rights bearer is
acknowledged"-public duties are those "owed to the state as representing
the citizens, 60 We will return to this point later.
55.

See id.

56.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 306.

57. Id. at 308-09 (footnote omitted); see O'Rourke, supra note 21, at 142 n.8 (citing works
characterizing Hohfeld's framework as applicable to "private law" and "common law").
58. See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 309 & n.32, 311 (citing scholars
"applying the Hohfeld framework in constitutional law" and finding O'Rourke's defense of that
application "very convincing"); O'Rourke, supra note 21, at 154-70; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical

Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 694 & n.160 (2013) (citing scholarship in suggesting that "Hohfeldian
analysis is common in contemporary constitutional literature"). See generally H. Newcomb Morse,
Applying the Hohfeld System to ConstitutionalAnalysis, 9 WHITTiER L. REv. 639 (1988).
59. See ALAN R. WHITE, RIGHTS 62-63 (1984)); Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 LAW & PHIL.
537, 541-42 (2009) (citing Nigel E. Simmonds, Introduction to WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (David Campbell & Philip

Thomas eds., 2001)); see also J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 81-83 (1980).
60.

SURI RATNAPALA, JURISPRUDENCE 348 (2d ed. 2013); see also Perry, supra note 59, at 544

("A possible answer [to the criticism] is that the correlativity axiom encompasses collective legal
positions, including collective rights. Under this view, a public duty is owed to a collectivity which
holds the correlative right, be it a distinct class of persons, the public at large, or the state." (citing
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Let us now consider the right to education's forms utilizing the
Hohfeldian framework.
1. A "Power"Held by the State
The right to education does not take the form of a Hohfeldian power
held by children. No law entitles children to create, waive, or annul their
own or anyone else's claim-rights or privileges with respect to public
education. That is, no child is empowered to alter her or another's legal
relations regarding publicly funded and regulated education.
Rather, the second-order power to amend first-order legal relationships
regarding education is held almost exclusively by the state.62 In fact, "[t]he
overwhelming majority of state constitutions give the state plenary power
over the education of its children." 63 And as Bauries observes, in states
where courts have held that the right to education is nonjusticiable, the
legislature has a "nearly unlimited Hohfeldian power" that is, in practice,
"virtually unreviewable."64
In the majority of states where the right to education is justiciable,
Bauries explains that courts have taken one of three paths in resolving
school finance challenges. Bauries believes that the first two paths
demonstrate that state courts have mainly conceived the right to education

Kramer, supra note 22, at 59)); cf Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of ConstitutionalRights,
13 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 27 (1993) ("The term correlative to the [constitutional] claim-right is of
course the duty incumbent upon officials and others to respect and uphold the right. And the term
correlative to the constitutional immunity is what Hohfeld would call a disability: in effect, a disabling
of the legislature from its normal functions of revision, reform and innovation in the law.").
61. The following analysis builds on, supplements, and amends Bauries's scholarship which
"analyzes the population of reported cases from the highest state courts to identify Hohfeldian
conceptions of education rights held or applied by state courts." Bauries, Conceptual Convergence,
supranote 14, at 305.
62. The people, of course, retain the power to amend the U.S. Constitution in a manner
conforming with Article V and to amend their respective state constitution. See G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 74 (1998) (noting state constitutions commonly include "an

explicit recognition that political power came from the people," and that such provisions clarified "that
the people did not require amendment or .. . provisions to change the constitution" because they
presumed existence of such power and "merely specified a procedure by which it could be exercised").
63.

John Schomberg, Equity v. Autonomy: The Problems ofPrivateDonationsto Public Schools,

1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 143, 176; accord Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under
State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1992) (tallying forty-two state constitutions
that grant states plenary power over education); see also Christopher P. Lu, Note, Liberator or Captor:
Defining the Role of the Federal Government in School Finance Reform, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 543,

546 (1991) ("[T]he states possess 'plenary power' over education, despite having 'delegat[ed]
considerable educational policymaking authority to local agencies."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and IndividualRights, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1375-77
(1976))).
64. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 340-42 (citing state court decisions in
Rhode Island, Alaska, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Alabama, Florida, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Illinois).
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as a Hohfeldian power held by the legislature.65 Along these two paths,
courts either (1) construe the right to education utilizing judicially created
standards but then abstain from ordering remediation directed at the
legislature due to "separation of powers concerns" 66 or (2) order
remediation but only after adopting the "legislatively developed
standard[s]." 6 7
In either case, although the language of the state constitutions and the
opinions of the highest courts couch the right to education as a claim-right
held by children correlative to a duty imposed on the state, Bauries thinks
the deference accorded to the legislature at the merits review or remedial
stages suggests otherwise-"that the courts are actually acting on
conceptions of their education clauses as sources of legislative powers, not
duties."6 8 I raise some doubts about this assertion later, but, accepting
Bauries's framing for now, it should not be surprising or troubling.
It may seem counterintuitive to think of the right to education as a right
that empowers the state and places children under a correlative liability.
But the notion that a state must be so empowered to protect children's wellbeing can be traced to the very beginnings of public education systems in
the United States. It stems from the view that children are not fully
autonomous agents-a recognition that states have long used to justify
"parenspatriae authority to intercede in the lives of children in order to
protect their safety, to promote their education, or otherwise to further their
best interests" when their parents or guardians have failed to do so.6 9
The parens patriae doctrine "has governed American policy toward
children and families for two centuries." 70 "Consider the variety of these
child-saving efforts: public schools, orphanages, reformatories,
psychological testing, vocational guidance, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), day-care centers, and parenting classes-to name just a
few."7 Regarding public schools in particular, states "have relied on the
parens patriae doctrine in enacting compulsory-education laws" dating

65. See id at 340.
66.
Id at 343-46 (citing state court decisions in Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona).
67. Id at 346-49 (citing state court decisions in Kansas, Georgia, Missouri, Oregon, and
Indiana).
68. Id. at 343.
69. Anne C. Dailey, Children's ConstitutionalRights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2106-12 (2011).
70. David F. Labaree, Parens Patriae The PrivateRoots of Public Policy Toward Children, 26
HIST. EDUC.

Q.

111, 112 (1986) (reviewing W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN

PROMISES (1982)); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 60 n.l (1890) ("Instances of this kind of legislation, in which the legislature clearly
acts as parenspatriae,may be found almost without number.").
71. Labaree, supra note 70, at 111.
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back to at least the nineteenth century.72 States have also invoked that
common law doctrine together with their general police powers 73 to hold
children liable under truancy laws 74 and discipline them for their
misconduct in school.75
As the Supreme Court has explained, concurrent with the state's parens
patriaepower is the state's duty to act in the interest of the child and the
public. 7 6 "The concept of parens patriae is derived from the English
constitutional system" wherein "the King retained certain duties and
powers . . as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for
themselves." 77 In America, states were "vested with the historic parens
patriae power, including the duty to protect" such persons.78 Parens
patriae has thus been "defined by many states as more than just a [power],
but also a duty to protect the interests of children." 7 9 The state's duty to
protect children through education in particular emanates from "the natural
duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life." 80

72.
See Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child
Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 57 (2007); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.

158, 166 (1944) ("[T]he state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance ..... (footnotes omitted)).
73. "Since it is difficult to distinguish the two sources of power in this context, commentators
suggest that 'the authority of the state to oversee the child's education is founded upon both' the parens
patriae power and the police power of the states." Lisa M. Lukasik, Comment, The Latest Home
Education Challenge: The Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L. REv.

1913, 1944 (1996) (quoting James C. Easterly, Comment, "Parent v. State ": The Challenge to
Compulsory School Attendance Laws, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y. 83, 89 (1990)).

74. See Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 715,
759-60, 765 (2013). Or, by extension, parents and legal guardians can be held liable for their children's
truancy. See generally Janet Stroman, Holding Parents Liable for Their Children's Truancy, 5 U.C.

DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 47 (2000).
75. See Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due Process Rights
of Children, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 426 (1996) (explaining that the Supreme Court "extended
power to the state under the parens patriae power to justify compulsory education, then found a

coextensive parenspatriaepower to justify disciplining the children" (emphasis added)).
76. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
77. Id. The concept probably arose earlier "in ancient civilizations such as Greece, Egypt, and
Persia." Thomas J. Cunningham, ConsideringReligion as a Factor in Foster Care in the Aftermath of

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 53, 96 (1994).
78. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975). For a history of the doctrine's
application, see George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of a Parens Patriae: The State as Parentor

Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 895 (1976).
79. See Rebecca Williams, Note, Faith Healing Exceptions Versus Parens Patriae: Something's
Gotta Give, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 692, 722 (2012) (citing cases); see also Cty. of McLean v.
Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383 (1882) ("It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every
enlightened government, in its character of parenspatrice, to protect and provide for the comfort and

well-being of such of its citizens [who] are unable to take care of themselves.").
80. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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Hence, even if, as Bauries maintains, the majority of state courts have
operationalized the right to education as a Hohfeldian power held by the
legislature,8 ' that power is not unfettered and indeed must be attendant to
the state's duties. Whether any of these state duties correspond to
Hohfeldian claim-rights-as suggested by the third path that some states
have taken-is, again, an issue we will address in depth later. For now, it
should be understood that the Hohfeldian power does not exhaust all forms
of the right to education.
2. A Qualified "Privilege"Held by Parentsor Guardians
The right to education does not take the form of a Hohfeldian privilege
held by children. The law enables-indeed encourages-parents,
guardians, and state actors to interfere directly in the public education of
children. Moreover, compulsory education laws deprive children of the
privilege not to receive an education.
To be sure, parents retain the privilege under the U.S. Constitution to
decide whether their children will receive a public or private education 82
and, in a more general sense, the privilege "to control the education of their
own,"83 including directing the religious education of their children. 8 4
Notably, however, these privileges are not unrestrained" and may be
subject to the exercise of state powers that bear "reasonable" regulations.
Consequently, although these parental privileges have been described as
fundamental,87 some courts have concluded otherwise because the language
81. See Dailey, supra note 69, at 2112-13 (explaining that "state parens patriae authority does
not lead to children having rights of their own").
82. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925).
83. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
84. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
85. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) ("The Court has repeatedly stressed that
while parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private schools and ... to select
private schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their
children with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation."); Brown v.
Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding parents' liberty interest
to choose their children's education free of governmental interference did not include right to "dictate
the curriculum" and thereby "restrict the flow of information"), abrogatedby Cty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067-70 (6th Cir.
1987) (denying parental challenges to textbook reading series).
86. See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("[W]e have recognized that a state is not
without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or
mental health is jeopardized."); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 ("There is no doubt as to the power of a State,
having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education."); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 ("The power of the state to compel
attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools ... is not questioned.").
87. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n.5 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("This Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to
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of the Supreme Court's opinions suggests that laws infringing on these
privileges merit rational basis review, not strict scrutiny. And the Court
has failed to specify the applicable standard. On the one hand, it has
emphasized that the interest of parents "in the care, custody, and control of
their children . .. is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests"
it has recognized; 89 on the other hand, it has employed a balancing test,
weighing parental liberty interests against competing state interests. 90
Whether the parental privilege to "control the . . education" of
children is fundamental or not, it is by no means absolute. 9 1 Furthermore,
as Bauries points out, courts have typically construed state constitutional
rights to education in resolving school finance litigation, and in that
context, "it simply fits poorly" to speak of children possessing a privilege
"to a certain amount of educational resources." 92 The focus in those cases is
not on the child's ability to act without interference but on whether the
state's appropriation of resources is adequate or equitable. 93 The point
being that courts have not confined the right to education's form to a
Hohfeldian privilege. And even when the right does take the form of a
privilege, it is one essentially held by parents and guardians. Still, it is fair
to say that we think of children themselves as holders of some form of the
right to education. The next two sections explore that idea.
3. An "Immunity" Held by ChildrenAgainst the State
The right to education has taken the form of an immunity held by
children. Curiously, "immunities have not generally received as much
attention" as other Hohfeldian incidents, even though "they are of huge

educate their children."); see also Jack MacMullan, Comment, The Constitutionality of State Home
Schooling Statutes, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1309, 1320 n.64 (1994) (citing scholarship concluding that
parental privileges regarding their children's education are fundamental and should be subject to strict
scrutiny).

88. See MacMullan, supra note 87, at 1320 & n.65 (collecting cases where courts "have balked
at recognizing a fundamental parental right to direct their children's education"); Timothy Brandon
Waddell, Note, Bringing It All Back Home: Establishinga Coherent ConstitutionalFrameworkfor the

Re-Regulation ofHomeschooling, 63 VAND. L. REV. 541, 569 (2010).
89. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing
that none of the six Justices who joined the opinion "articulate[] the appropriate standard of review" but
asserting that strict scrutiny should apply "to infringements of fundamental rights").
90. See Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Troxel to require
balancing of factors regarding parents' fundamental right and state's compelling interests); David D.
Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 115253, 1163-64 (2001).
91. Care and Prot. of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 598-99 (Mass. 1987) (concluding liberty interest
of parents to educate their children "is not absolute but must be reconciled with the substantial State
interest in the education of its citizenry").
92. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supranote 14, at 328.
93. See id.
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importance."94 Significantly, many of the constitutional entitlements
enshrined in the Bill of Rights can take the form of immunities.95 These
immunities deprive Congress and, by incorporation, state legislatures of the
power to enact certain kinds of laws, thereby imposing on legislative
bodies correlative disabilities.96
"For instance, one has an immunity right to freedom of expression,
which bars the legislature from enacting legislation that extinguishes one's
['privilege'] to speak." 9 7 If the legislature enacts such a law, it will be
deemed unconstitutional "because the legislature will have exceeded the
limits of what it is constitutionally empowered to do."
It is expedient that many of our most prominent constitutional rights
include or take the form of immunities. A Hohfeldian immunity plays a
critical "role in stabilizing other legal entitlements"-mainly by preventing
others from divesting one of his claim-rights and privileges.9 9 And it is
"because legal rights are almost always accompanied by immunities against
most types of divestiture, [that such rights] provide solid legal protection
against interference or uncooperativeness." 0 0 Hence, "we are likely to
assert even trivial immunities as rights when we find others trying to make
us do things that they are not empowered to require of us." 0 1
So it should not diminish the right to education to note that it has taken
the form of an immunity held by children. Indeed, Bauries avers that
Brown v. Board of Education,102 the most renowned public education case,
can be viewed as recognizing an immunity held by children against "state
legislation requiring segregated schools."' 03 For a time, Brown was
94. Kramer, supra note 21, at 416-17.
95. See id at 417. Bauries goes so far as to assert that "the vast majority of the legal relationships
set up in the U.S. Constitution between individuals and legislative bodies are relationships of powers,
liabilities, immunities, and disabilities." Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 312. I
reserve judgment regarding the unassailability of that assertion.
96. Alon Harel, Theories of Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

AND LEGAL THEORY 191, 193 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
97.

Id; see also WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 91 (2004) ("To say

that citizens enjoy a right of free speech is to say that they are immune from certain alterations of their
legal duties, and this is in turn to say that the legislature is disabled from imposing certain legal
duties."); Waldron, supra note 60, at 27 ("To think that a constitutional immunity is called for is to
think oneself justified in disabling legislators in this respect (and thus, indirectly, in disabling the
citizens whom they represent).").
98.
PETER JONES, RIGHTS 24 (1994); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporationof the
Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and HistoricalAccount, 88 IND. L.J. 669,

694-95 (2013) ("Constitutional disabilities on government action necessarily create correlative
constitutional immunities from the consequences of actions that exceed the bounds of the disability.").
99. Kramer, supra note 21, at 417.
100.

Id; see also REX MARTIN, A SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 31 (1993) ("[T]he most important means

of institutionalizing some rights may be to create second-party disabilities . .. rather than duties.").
101.

JONES, supra note 98, at 25.

102.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

103.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supranote 14, at 326.
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perceived to confer more than an immunity against de jure segregation.
Courts faithfully interpreted Brown's assertion that "the opportunity of an
education .. . is a right [that] must be made available to all on equal
terms"1 04 to signify a fundamental right to education under the Equal
Protection Clause. 05 Rodriguez explicitly held otherwise; nevertheless,
several state courts continued to adhere to Brown's reasoning in
interpreting their own constitutions, and as Bauries observes, many of these
courts essentially took Hohfeldian "disability- and immunity-based
approaches when presented with equality-based arguments" in school
finance cases.

06

In several of these cases, the immunity held by children regarding the
distribution of educational resources derives from recognition that the right
to education is fundamental under the state constitution., 0 7 In two of these
states, California and Wyoming, the immunity against disparities in school
funding also arises from the classification of wealth as a suspect class for
equal protection purposes.os
To be clear, none of the state courts that construe the right to education
as fundamental characterize it explicitly as an immunity. But several of
these courts have analyzed "whether legislative action was taken in excess
104.

347 U.S. at 493.

105. See Enrich,supra note 13, at 117 n.77 ("Over and over again, the initial education financing
cases in the early 1970's relied on Brown for the conclusion that education was a fundamental right,

deserving of intensive equal protection scrutiny." (citing Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.,
337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487
P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 469-70 (Mich. 1972),
vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 214 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1972))).
106.
107.

Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supranote 14, at 330.
The highest courts of fifteen states have previously recognized the right to education as a

fundamental constitutional right in resolving school finance litigation. See Opinion of the Justices, 624
So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (but see Roosevelt
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1994) (declining to decide whether
education is fundamental right under state's constitution)); Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1258; Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 201
(Ky. 1989); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Govemor
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1358-59 (N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C.
1997); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994); Tenn. Small Sch.
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 151 (Tenn. 1993); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142
(Va. 1994); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 104 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Pauley v. Kelly,
255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989); Washakie
Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332-33 (Wyo. 1980).
In a different context-a due process challenge to student discipline-the Supreme Court of Mississippi
recognized a statutorily created fundamental right to a "minimally adequate public education." See
Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985). The court has not yet
revisited that declaration since the education clause of the Mississippi constitution was amended in
1987 to provide "for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools upon such
conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe." MISS. CONST. art. 8,

108.
334.

§ 201.

See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976); Herschler, 606 P.2d at
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of the limitations placed on it by the state constitutions."'0 9 That is, their
focus has been on whether the legislature had contravened the
constitutionally imposed Hohfeldian disabilities correlative to "immunities
against unequal treatment."110 Courts in seven states recognizing a
fundamental right to education have indeed subjected their school financing
schemes to equal protection analysis."' Five of those courts applied strict
scrutiny, as would be expected for a fundamental right;" 2 one court
diverged on its own, applying an intermediate level of scrutiny;"'3 and yet
another court required only rational basis review to find its school
financing scheme unconstitutional."14
It is worth pausing here to point out that equal protection need not take
the exclusive form of an immunity, though that seems to be Bauries's own
view." 5 In certain contexts, equal protection reasonably can be regarded in
the form of a claim-right correlative to a duty on the statel'1 -an
entitlement that cannot be divested, without satisfying judicial scrutiny,
because it is embedded with an immunity."'7 Moreover, although Bauries
109. Bauries, ConceptualConvergence, supra note 14, at 332.
110. Id.
111. See Opinion ofthe Justices, 624 So. 2d at 159 (but see Exparte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala.
2002) (dismissing school finance litigation as nonjusticiable)); Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951; Horton, 376
A.2d at 373; Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 257; McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156;
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878; Herschler, 606 P.2d at 335.
112. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d at 159; Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951; Horton, 376
A.2d at 373; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878; Herschler, 606 P.2d at 335.
113. See Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 257.
114. See McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156.
115. See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 318 ("[W]here it exists against a
legislative body of the state or federal government, what we call a 'right to equal protection' is actually
an immunity against statutes that create invidious classifications, and where this immunity has been
ignored or transgressed for decades, the vestigial harms thereby created sometimes necessitate
affirmative remedial actions.").
116. See O'Rourke, supra note 21, at 160 (contending that the language of the Equal Protection
Clause "creates a primary rule giving each state a duty not to deny a person 'the equal protection of the
laws,' which correlates with a claim for 'any person within its jurisdiction"' (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1)); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 333 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Equal Protection Clause implements a duty to govern impartially that requires, at the very least,
that every decision by the sovereign serve some nonpartisan public purpose."); ROBIN WEST,
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1-4 (1994)

(arguing that equal protection imposes affirmative duties of protection); Black, supra note 11, at 32130 (contending that Fourteenth Amendment imposes affirmative duty on Congress to further and act
consistently with, not merely enforce, equal protection); Christopher R. Green, The OriginalSense of
the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretationand Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.

219, 220 (2009) (defending "duty-to-protect reading" of equal protection); Pamela S. Karlan, Note,
DiscriminatoryPurpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111,

123-24 (1983) ("[T]he [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause imposes a duty of 'virtual representation' upon the
legislature, an obligation that it consider the interests of all those whom its actions will affect.").
117. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 416-17; Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEORIES OF
RIGHTS 1, 7 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) ("Constitutionally guaranteed privileges and claim-rights often
also involve an immunity ....

); see also Susan Poser, Termination ofDesegregation Decreesand the

Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 329 (2002) (analyzing equal protection in the
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implies that the right to education has taken the form of an immunity
against unequal or inequitable distributions, a few courts have
comprehended an immunity against inadequate educational resources as
well. Courts in four states that regard the right to education as fundamental
have suggested that their legislatures were disabled from enacting a school
financing scheme that produced certain educational inadequacies. 18
The right to education also need not be exalted to fundamental right
status to confer an immunity. The highest courts in five states have
effectuated an immunity without declaring the right fundamental or
recognizing wealth as a suspect class. Those courts have held instead that
the school finance schemes approved by the legislatures directly violated
their state constitutions' education clauses.1 9 Again, these decisions
indicate that the right to education can take the form of an immunity
against inequitable 2 0 or inadequate' 2' distributions, or against both

context of desegregation jurisprudence and suggesting that, in Hohfeldian terms, it takes the form of
both "an immunity from being forced into segregated schools" and a "duty to assign all children to
school on a non-discriminatory basis").
118. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815 (Ariz. 1973)
("[T]he system the legislature chooses to fund the public schools must not itself be the cause of
substantial disparities.... [If reliance on property taxes and school districts] produce a public school
system that cannot be said to be general and uniform throughout the state, then the laws chosen by the
legislature to implement its constitutional obligation ... fail in their purpose."); Skeen v. State, 505
N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) ("[T]his court will not strike down the legislature's financingof such a
system unless the resulting disparities dilute the adequacy of the constitutional entitlement to a 'general
and uniform system' of education."); Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) ("Imposing
dissimilar and unreasonable tax burdens on the school districts creates serious impediments to the
State's constitutional charge to provide an adequate education for its public school students."); Kukor v.
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 582 (Wis. 1989) ("While our deference would abruptly cease should the
legislature determine that it was 'impracticable' to provide to each student a right to attend a public
school at which a basic education could be obtained, or if funds were discriminatorily disbursed and
there existed no rational basis for such finance system, we will otherwise defer to the legislature's
determination of the degree to which fiscal policy can be applied to achieve uniformity.").
119. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92-95 (Ark. 1983); Gannon v. State,
319 P.3d 1196, 1239-47 (Kan. 2014); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 68991 (Mont. 1989); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384,
397 (Vt. 1997).
120. See DuPree, 651 S.W.2d at 95 (affirming lower court's ruling that financing scheme
violated "state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws [by denying] equal
educational opportunity" (quoting SerranoII, 557 P.2d 929, 946 (Cal. 1976))); Helena, 769 P.2d at 690
(affirming lower court's ruling that "spending disparities among the State's school districts translate
into a denial of equality of educational opportunity"); Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397 ("[W]e hold that the
student and school district plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the current
educational financing system in Vermont violates the right to equal educational opportunities
under ...

the Vermont Constitution.").

121. See DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 741 (agreeing with prior precedent that legislature's discretion
was "not without limits" and that a financing scheme would be unconstitutionally inadequate "if a
school district was receiving so little local and state revenue that the students were effectively being
deprived of educational opportunity" (internal quotation marks omitted))
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inequitable and inadequate distributions.1 2 2
Altogether, then, courts in at least sixteen states have at times
articulated the right to education in the form of an immunity, though the
content and relative strength of that immunity vary. As we shall see, a few
of these same courts and several others have espoused the right to
education as a claim-right as well-the third path that courts have tread in
resolving school finance litigation.
4. A "Claim-Right"Held by Children Correlativewith State Duties
The right to education has taken the form of a claim-right held by
children. First and foremost, "most state constitutions [furnish] a strong
textual basis for an explicit Hohfeldian duty to provide for education."l 23
For instance, most of the education clause provisions employ "duty-based
terms such as 'shall' to impose obligations" on the state.' 24 Some express
the duty generally to "establish and maintain" public schools, others direct
the duty "to hortatory purposes, such as to 'encourage' education," and still
others "specify detailed requirements for the provision of educational
services." 2 5
Notwithstanding the strong textual support, Bauries concludes that the
majority of state courts have not conceptualized "the education clauses in
their state constitutions as sources of Hohfeldian claim-rights correlative to
legislative duties."l 2 6 By his count, courts in six states have construed their
states' constitutions as sources of a Hohfeldian claim-right to education.1 27
According to Bauries, only these six state courts "articulated both the duty
and the individual right" and entered or approved entry of a remedial order
"compelling the performance of the legislative duty on behalf of the
plaintiffs." 2 8
The last point is key for Bauries because "claim-rights call for
enforcement." 2 9 On his view, to enforce a claim-right correlative to a
"positive" duty, like the duty to provide education, a court "must compel

122. See Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1233, 1238-47 (remanding to lower court for determination of
whether school financing scheme satisfied "adequacy test" but upholding lower court's decision that
scheme failed the "equity test" by creating "unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities").
123.

Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supranote 14, at 325.

124. Id. at 323.
125. Id. at 323, 324.
126. Id at 340.
127. See id. at 333-40 (discussing the decisions of state courts in Arkansas, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming).
128. Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 352.
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action (as it does in a specific performance contractual case)."130 So even
though Bauries notes that eight other state courts have articulated "dutybased conceptions" of the right to education, those courts did not compel
their legislatures to undertake specific remediation, citing "separation of
powers concerns."l 3 1 Thus, according to Bauries, the plaintiffs in those
cases apparently did not possess a claim-right because they could not
"judicially compel the duty's performance." 3 2
To be sure, a right must be enforceable to take the form of a genuine
claim-right. 133 But it does not follow that a right to education exists as a
claim-right only if it has been judicially enforced by an injunctive remedy.
Here we must consider the elusive relationship between legal rights and
remedies. For Hohfeld, "the question of the existence of a right is distinct
from the question of the availability of a remedy for the violation of that
right." 3 4 That is, he considered a right logically prior to its remedy,
tracking the noted distinction between a "primary right" and a "secondary
right" (also referred to simply as the "remedy" or, as used here for
consistency, a "remedial right").1 35

130. Id. at 353 ("Ostensibly, if an individual has a claim-right to educational services, then he
should be able to compel the provision of such services to him."); see also id. at 317 ("[A] positive
right, in Hohfeldian terms, can only take the form of a claim-right to compel the government to act in a
certain way toward the holder of the right.").

131. Id. at 343-46 (discussing state court decisions in Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona).
132. Id. at 343.
133. See Kramer, supra note 22, at 9, 64 ("[Claim-rights] must be enforceable if they are to
qualify as genuine claims . . . ."). Apart from legal rights, philosophers debate whether moral rights can
exist independent of enforcement mechanisms. Compare RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN
POLITICS 146 (2001) (asserting that rights exists only when they are "backed up by an effective method
of implementation"), and Susan James, Rights as Enforceable Claims, 103 PROCEEDINGS

&

ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 133, 136-37 (2003) (agreeing with Geuss and proposing three conditions of
enforceability), with Cruft, supra note 53, at 393 (contending that a moral right "can exist whether or
not institutions exist to enforce it"), and Katherine Eddy, Against Ideal Rights, 34 Soc. THEORY
PRAc. 463, 466 (2008) (rejecting James's enforcement view of moral rights).
134.

RATNAPALA, supra note 60, at 350; see also Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and

Properties,4 J. TORT L. 1, 3 (2011) ("Hohfeld claims that rights should be carefully distinguished from,
and not only be thought as dependent on, both the character of the proceedings by which [they] may be
vindicated and the remedies arising from their violation." (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). This is not to say that Hohfeld was necessarily committed to the proposition that a

right can exist without any remedy. In truth, "there is nothing in his writing that commits him either
way." EDMUNDSON, supra note 97, at 99; see also John Finnis, Some Professorial FallaciesAbout

Rights, 4 ADELAIDE L. REv. 377, 380 (1972) ("The relevance of 'legal remedies' to the defining terms
of his schema is left entirely undetermined by Hohfeld." (emphasis omitted)).
135.

See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN

THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122-34 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994). The primary-secondary rights distinction preceded Hart and Sacks's exposition. See, e.g., I
JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 44-45 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117-21 (1979); JOHN NORTON POMEROY,
REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS §§ 1-3 (1876). "Hohfeld too emphasized the distinction in his
classification" before Hart and Sacks. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of
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Primary rights are created by voluntary agreement or by operation of
law. 136 For instance, a primary right to education might exist by operation
of the education clause in the state constitution, and it would exist
independently, meaning its existence would not depend "on the breach of a
preexisting right or duty."l37 By contrast, remedial rights-including the
power to initiate legal proceedings to demand damages or performanceexist solely to provide a legal process and consequence for infringements of
the primary right. 13 8 Thus, primary rights have been regarded as the "pure
values" of the law, whereas "remedial rights are those tangential, practical
questions of how to implement those core values."139 Daryl Levinson dubs
1 40
this approach, to constitutional law in particular, "rights essentialism."
Rights essentialism assumes a process of constitutional
adjudication that begins with judicial identification of a pure
constitutional value. The pure value is then corrupted by being
forced into a remedial apparatus that translates the right into an
operational rule applied to the facts of the real world.1 4 1
That "rights exist in a separate realm from-and can be defined
without reference to-remedies" pervades "the conventional understanding
of constitutional law,"l 4 2 counting among its adherents eminent legal

Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 607 (2008) (citing
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 18, at 108-)9).

136.
137.

Balganesh, supra note 135, at 605.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News": The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111

COLUM. L. REV. 419, 481 (2011) (citing HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note
18, at 101-02); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, FederalStatutory Review Under Section 1983 and the

APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 249 (1991) ("Primary law concerns the authoritative directive
arrangements-or more simply, the legal rules-that govern persons independently of litigation."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. See HART & SACKS, supra note 135, at 122. A remedial right can take the form of a "right
of action," which is the "capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of authoritative application upon
a disputed question about the application of preexisting arrangements and to secure, if the claim proves

to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy." Id. at 137; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Philosophy ofPrivale Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

623, 632-33 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (suggesting that the remedial right of action
takes the form of a Hohfeldian "legal power (albeit conditioned and mediated)" because if the plaintiff
is successful, she "will alter the legal relation between herself and the defendant").

139. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress'Section5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
673, 683 (2001) (citing Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 46, 54-55 (1979); Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status

of UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978)).
140.

See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REV.

857(1999).
141. Id at 858 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 858, 914. "Rights occupy an exalted sphere of principle, while remedies are consigned
to the banausic sphere of policy, pragmatism, and politics." Id. at 857.
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theoristS1 43 and Supreme Court Justices. 144 Nevertheless, Levinson rejects
rights essentialism in favor of "remedial equilibration," a view that
acknowledges the interdependence of rights and remedies: "Rights are
dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but
for their scope, shape, and very existence."1 4 5 This notion, that rights and
remedies are so "inextricably intertwined,"1 46 accords with the thinking of
early legal realists, law and economics scholars, and leading pragmatists.1 4 7
i.

The

Claim-Right

to

Education-Emblematic of

Rights

Essentialism or Remedial Equilibration?
Levinson proposes three observable means by which remedies alter
rights, 148 one of which is most pertinent to school finance litigationremedial deterrence. Its "defining feature is the threat of undesirable
remedial consequences motivating courts to construct the right in such a
way as to avoid those consequences."l 49 For example, Levinson suggests
that courts constricted the scope of Brown's equal protection right to a
prohibition on de jure segregation because a de facto interpretation would
143.

See id. at 867-72 & nn.49, 58 & 64 (identifying Ronald Dworkin, Richard Fallon, Owen

Fiss, Henry Monaghan, Lawrence Sager, Frederick Schauer, and Peter Schuck as rights essentialists).
"Scholars who work in this tradition see their mission as elucidating the essential characteristics of legal
entitlements, offering typologies of entitlements, and positioning entitlements within the greater
framework of legal concepts." Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of

Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1335 (2012).
144. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Onedia Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 213 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.)
("The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has any right or the defendant has any duty, and if so
what it is, are very different questions from the remedial questions whether this remedy or that is
preferred, and what the measure of the remedy is." (quoting D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF

REMEDIES

§

1.2, at 3 (1973))); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1992) ("As we

have often stated, the question of what remedies arc available under a statute that provides a private
right of action is 'analytically distinct' from the issue of whether such a right exists in the first place."

(quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979))).
145. Levinson, supra note 140, at 858.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 94 (1960)
("[A] right is best measured by effects in life. Absence of remedy is absence of right."); Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the

Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of The
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201, 2205 (1997) ("Of course, the so-called remedy defines the nature of the
right. . . ." (footnote omitted)); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of
the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 992 (1997) ("[A] legal duty so called is nothing but
a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by
judgment of the court; - and so of a legal right."); Levinson, supra note 140, at 927-31 & n.315
(contending that "remedial equilibration has deep affinities" with the "anti-rights-essentialist thrust" of

Richard Posner's and Cass Sunstein's scholarship and that David Strauss and Posner can, despite their
differences, "comfortably coexist under the big tent of remedial equilibration").
148. See Levinson, supra note 140, at 885-88, 889-911 (defining "remedial deterrence,"
"incorporation," and "substantiation" and providing case illustrations of each form of equilibration at
work).

149.

Id. at 885.
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have entailed indefinite federal court supervision of school districts and
measures such as busing to achieve and sustain racial balance. 50
Remedial deterrence reinforces Bauries's conclusion that the right to
education has not been conceptualized as a claim-right in cases where
courts have articulated a claim-right-duty correlation but have nevertheless
failed to enter an injunction compelling specific performance. Those courts
have been disinclined to enjoin their legislatures to perform-i.e., in most
cases, to increase school funding-because such orders might encroach on
legislative prerogatives over the state budget and thus potentially violate
the separation of powers. 5 ' As a result, Bauries contends that those courts
have curtailed the constitutional duty to a simple "duty to legislate" and
have paired that duty with legislative Hohfeldian powers to decide how to
establish and maintain the education system, "at what level to fund it," and
sometimes even "the discretion to determine what the education clause
itself means."' 5 2 In so doing, Bauries thinks those courts have, despite their
rhetoric, altered the form of the right to education from a claim-right to a
modest immunity correlative to few legislative disabilities, preventing
"only legislative action that is arbitrary" in providing an adequate
education.' 53
From the remedial equilibration viewpoint, that analysis may be sound.
Yet rights essentialists could perceive those same decisions as illustrating
the expected "gaps" between rights and remedies.1 5 4 They could even
commend the courts for preserving the constitutional value at stake by
articulating the right to education as a claim-right correlative to a'
legislative duty notwithstanding the reluctance to enforce that primary right
through a remedial right of specific performance.
It is unclear whether Bauries fully assents to either perspective.
Although he acknowledges the "force" of arguments favoring equilibration,
he "adheres to the view that, at some level, rights and remedies can and

150.

See id at 884; see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 602

(1983) (analyzing school desegregation decisions and asserting that remedial "costs obviously play a
role in defining the content of the right itself').
151.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 353-54.

152. Id.at349,350,351.
153. Id. at 364; see id. at 361. Such a description of the legislative disability, according to
Bauries, "fits the conception that the overwhelming majority of state courts have actually applied." Id
at 364.
154. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
87, 91-95 (1999) ("The distance between the ideal and the real means that there will always be some
shortfall between the aspirations we call rights and the mechanisms we call remedies."); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L.

REv. 1275, 1317 (2006) ("[A] gap frequently exists between constitutional meaning and judicially
enforced doctrine . . . .").
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should be thought of distinctly."155 Bauries would not be the first to attempt
to straddle both rights essentialism and remedial equilibration.1 5 6 Even
Hohfeld, who advanced the right-remedy dichotomy, has been accused of
distorting it. 157

To Bauries's credit, both accounts acknowledge that rights and
remedies can be distinguished, at least conceptually. The rights essentialist
finds value in legal discourse that venerates that conceptual distinction,
even when remedies influence the way rights are adjudicated and
enforced;'5 8 the pragmatist finds value in discourse that is more forthright
in expressing "the permeability of the conceptual membrane separating
rights from remedies."159 Perhaps, as some have suggested, these positions
are not that far apart and could be reconciled in some manner.' 60 That
155.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 318 n.73. For Bauries, the

"distinction is that the primary right is present and the remedial right is inchoate and conditional." Id.
(noting that "especially in public law litigation[, the remedial right] is subject to significant ad hoc
judicial discretion-which includes the discretion not to order a remedy at all").
156. See Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 15, at 733 (implying that when the remedial right
cannot be perfected the primary right is "devalued at best and eliminated at worst"). But see id. at 733

n.147 (suggesting that such a "conclusion is a natural extension of the well-known theory of 'remedial
equilibration"').
157.

See David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government

Misconduct, 26 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 101, 198 n.502 (2005) (noting that Hart and Sacks claimed that
Hohfeld "blurred" the distinction between primary and secondary rights "by essentially arguing that it is
obvious that if there is no remedy, there is no right, but conced[ing] that in some circumstances the

secondary right may be in addition to an obligation to perform a court-ordered performance of a
primary duty"). But see GERALD J. POSTEMA, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE

COMMON LAW WORLD 102 (2011) ("Hlohfeld's analysis is not committed to the familiar doctrine that
there is no right without a remedy, but it can explain the doctrine.").

158. Cf Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2004)
(suggesting that "judges, scholars, and litigators should make greater efforts to distinguish whether a
constitutional rule is an announcement of constitutional meaning (i.e., a constitutional operative

proposition) or, instead, is a constitutional decision rule," which might be supplemented by remedial
rules, because it will "improve the project of constitutional adjudication" to make that distinction).
159. Levinson, supra note 140, at 939; see Gewirtz, supra note 150, at 678-79 ("There is a
permeable wall between rights and remedies: The prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy-the
recognition that rights are for actual people in an actual world-makes it inevitable that thoughts of

remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges' minds will shuttle back and forth between right and
remedy.").
160. See Berman, supra note 158, at 50-51 (proposing the possibility of drawing "coherent
dividing lines within the sprawling sphere of constitutional doctrine .. .in a way that does not depend
upon the anti-Pragmatist assumption that a meaningful sort of constitutional interpretation exists which
does not involve 'practical' or 'instrumental' considerations" (footnote omitted)); Fallon, supra note

154, at 1314 (disagreeing with remedial equilibration but noting that "many of [his own] claims" about
constitutional adjudication and the gaps between constitutional norms and their implementation "would

fit comfortably within a pragmatist framework"); Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translationand Remedial
Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, I 10 COLUM. L. REv. 1002, 1013-14 (2010)
(attempting to bring the "pragmatist" (remedial equilibration) and "decision rules model[s]" (rights
essentialism) together by elucidating the process of "rights translation," which "prioritizes stability in
constitutional meaning and attention to the relationship between constitutional principles and the tests

that implement them" but "demands that courts assess the possibility that remedial imperatives require
doctrinal refinement"); Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F.

193, 194-95 (2005) (agreeing with Levinson that "remedial considerations exert an important influence
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project is, of course, well beyond the purview of this Article. Yet we need
not resolve the larger debate to find an acceptable path forward.
ii. Nominal Claim-Rights
When the primary right has been deemed judicially unenforceable, and
thus the remedial right is unobtainable, the primary right is "inoperative"
and "purely nominal."' 6 ' Bauries questions whether, in such circumstances,
it makes sense to call a constitutional provision a "right."l 6 2 That sentiment
is shared by supporters of the "will theory" of rights, as explained in the
next section.
But, assuming the ontological existence of nominal rights,
there is no logical reason that such rights cannot take the form of
Hohfeldian claim-rights correlative to nominal duties.
"Nominal" might be somewhat of a misnomer because such claimrights still impose legal norms that can "channel and direct people's
conduct[-e.g., elicit compliance-]in ways that are not attainable by
nonexistent legal norms."'65 People can and do resolve to discharge their
nominal duties in recognition of the important interests they serve, perform

&

over the shape of' decision rules "that courts apply to determine whether rights have been violated" and
that such "interrelation of remedies and decision rules is .. .entirely consistent with the decision rules
model").
161. See Matthew H. Kramer, On the Nature of Legal Rights, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 473, 482-83
(2000) (explaining that, without a remedy, a "legal duty is purely nominal ... because no one has any
legal power to take or induce" measures to enforce the duty); cf Levinson, supra note 140, at 934
(observing that when the Supreme Court "put an end to effective school desegregation by cutting off
remedies ... the nominal right [to integration remained] intact" (emphasis added)).
162. See Bauries, EducationDuty, supra note 15, at 763.
163. See Kramer, supra note 161, at 486 ("[T]he [w]ill (t]heory obliges its proponents to deny
the existence of any unenforceable legal rights."). It is also a sentiment reflected in the jurisprudential
tradition that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Thomas R. Phillips, The ConstitutionalRight to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1309, 1310 & n.6 (2003) (observing that the right to a remedy "expressly or implicitly appears in forty
state constitutions"); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement
of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987). As it has been repeatedly observed,
however, "the Marbury dictum simply does not describe reality." Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and
the ExtrajudicialConstitution, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1533, 1586 (2007).
164. See Kramer, supra note 22, at 34 ("Though an absence of enforcement deprives [claim-]
rights of their genuineness, it has exactly the same effect on the rights' correlative obligations. Hence,
an unenforced statute maintains a strict correlativity of duties and rights; just as genuine duties must
correlate with genuine rights, nominal duties must correlate with nominal rights."); see also HART
SACKS, supra note 135, at 137 ("Such a right, in strictness, is a valid claim to the personal benefit of the
performance of a legal duty, not deriving from any default (through breach of duty or defective exercise
of power) occurring in any precedent legal position... . The breach of a primary private duty may or
may not give rise, by operation of law, to a remedial private duty.").
165. Kramer, supra note 161, at 493. Such norms establish more than voluntary guidelines
because they are presented "as mandates which disallow routes that are incompatible with what the
norms require." Id at 495; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57-68 (1990)

(drawing on sociological research to suggest that individual compliance with criminal norms depends
less on the sanctions attached to those norms and more on perceptions of a legal system's legitimacy),
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them "simply out of habit," or fulfill their duties to avoid "punishment[-]
even if this is only social or moral criticism or regret." 6
Legislators are not impervious to such pressures and "might feel a
moral obligation, enforced through politics, to do what the constitution
says."1 6 7 Indeed, just because nominal claim-rights are judicially
unenforceable "does not mean that they are not enforceable at all.
Judicially unenforceable rights can have real world consequences if
enforced by the political branches."1 6 8 After all, "[m]any constitutional
provisions[, including many education clauses in state constitutions,] speak
in the first instance to officials other than judges."' 6 9
Short of formal litigation, the holder of a nominal claim-right can also
"demand the recognition and performance of the duty in numerous extrajudicial ways: in personal contact, in out of court settlements, in
arbitration[,] or before officials other than judges."o Within the confines
of a civil or criminal proceeding, the holder might raise a nominal claimright or duty as a shield in her defense.' 7 ' Courts can also justify their
refusal to recognize other rights that conflict with nominal claim-rights and
duties.1 7 2 And, as Helen Hershkoff has explained, even when the judiciary
declines to enforce certain constitutional rights directly, an "indirect

166.

MARK R. REIFF, PUNISHMENT, COMPENSATION, AND LAW: A THEORY OF ENFORCEABILITY

236-39 (2005) (explaining the previolation value of nominal rights).
167. Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of JudicialReview, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1895, 1901 (2004) (maintaining that nonjusticiable rights may have political salience in societies with
"entrenched democratic cultures-where civil society stands ready to inflict political damage to
legislators who depart from the constitution's requirements-and advanced welfare states"); see also
Frank I. Michelman, What (If Anything) Is Progressive-LiberalDemocratic Constitutionalism?, 4

WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181, 199 (1999) (asserting that in "some political cultures" constitutional rights
that "impose on non-judicial political actors" judicially unenforceable rights need not be "an empty
gesture," although acknowledging that American political culture may not be such a culture).
168. Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 453 (2004).
169. Fallon, supra note 154, at 1315; see also EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE
WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA'S POSITIVE RIGHTS, 92-94 (2013)

(observing that education activists and political actors encouraged the drafting of detailed, mandatory
education clauses in state constitutions to make it "harder for legislatures to ignore" and to "insulate

educational policies from potentially hostile judiciaries").
170.

PAVLOS ELEFTHERIADIS, LEGAL RIGHTS 117 (2008); see Philip Harvey, AspirationalLaw,

52 BUFF. L. REV. 701, 714 (2004) ("The most interesting and historically important examples of the
vindication of human rights claims have always involved situations in which popular movements used
extra-judicial means to enforce what they perceived to be a higher species of law.").
171. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, StructuralReform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1387, 1392 (2007) ("One way or another, persons who are targets of government coercion must be
given an opportunity to defend by showing that this action is taken in violation of the Constitution.");
see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring ConstitutionalViolations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 327 (1988) ("Offensive

remedies will often be preferable, [however], because the very freedom that defensive remedies give
officials in choosing how to respond is not always desirable.").
172. Tushnet, supra note 167, at 1898.
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constitutional effect" can be achieved when courts import a nominal right's
implicit norms into common law doctrine.1 7 3
If a primary right can take the form of a claim-right when there is no
remedial right, then it must also be the case that a primary right can take
the form of a claim-right when there is a remedial right to some relief other
than an injunctive remedy. The type of relief available may well affect the
primary right's content or scope,1 7 4 but it need not change its Hohfeldian
form.' 7 5 So long as the constitutional provision establishes a claim-right-

duty correlation, the right can retain the form of a genuine (as opposed to a
nominal) claim-right, provided it is judicially enforceable.1 7 6
"Enforcement," however, "is not a single event but is a process with
stages."' 77

iii. Enforcement of the Claim-Right to Education
The early stages of judicial enforcement involve the claim-right holder
exercising his power to seek redress in court. The possession of a
cognizable cause of action that invokes the coercive power of the state can
itself be a substantial means of enforcement.17 8 "In some states, the mere

173.

Helen Hershkoff, "Just Words ": Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional

Social andEconomic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1521, 1556-70 (2010).
174.

See Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism,supra note 15, at 969 (suggesting that Court's

adoption of rational basis review in Rodriguez demonstrates "how the content of a right becomes bound
up with concerns over its remediation" (emphasis added)); Dagan, supra note 134, at 6-7 (concluding
"that while remedies indeed exist for a purpose that is captured in the language of rights, the scope and
content of rights (and thus the availability of various types of remedies) are, or at least can and should
be, carefully circumscribed according to their underlying rationales"); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92
B.U. L. REv. 405, 416 (2012) (crediting Kermit Roosevelt's work for explaining that "the decision rules
and pragmatist positions share an important characteristic: the available remedy influences the content
of the right that courts articulate in a given case").

175. This view likely comports with the Hohfeldian scheme. See Balganesh, supra note 135, at
630 n.125 (suggesting that Hohfeld probably did not think of rights as completely independent of
remedies; rather his "analysis seems to be restricted to arguing that the nature and character of the

primary right were to be understood independent of the nature and character of the secondary right that
comes into play to enforce the former"); see also ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 170, at 112-13
(concluding that Hohfeld's scheme lies "somewhere between the dominant traditions of jurisprudence
at the dawn of the twentieth century, pragmatism and idealism").
176.

See ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 170, at 117 (explaining that a claim-right "can lead to a

number of different remedies: specific performance or claim for damages, or a combination of the
two"); cf Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at 1005 (suggesting violation of
claim-right to education could lead to several types of individualized remedies, including tuition
waivers, tutoring, after-school programs, changes in classroom settings, and vouchers).
177. Kramer, supra note 22, at 62; see also REIFF, supra note 166, at 45-75 (describing three
critical stages of enforcement-the previolation stage, the postviolation stage, and the postenforcement
stage).

178. See Kramer, supra note 22, at 62-63; see also supranote 134 and sources cited therein; cf
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18 (1979) ("A plaintiff may have a cause of action even though
he be entitled to no relief at all, as, for example, when a plaintiff sues for declaratory or injunctive relief
although his case does not fulfill the 'preconditions' for such equitable remedies.").
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filing of a complaint has led to significant [school finance] reforms." 7 9
Beyond the initiation of a civil action, the "claim-holder may miss a
deadline or go to the wrong court, or provide insufficient evidence and
therefore fail to win the remedy.',o But we would not say that the
rightholder's failure to secure a remedy in these circumstances means that
the right he sought to enforce was not a claim-right.' 8 ' Moreover, even
when, for instance, plaintiffs in school finance cases have been
unsuccessful, the litigation itself has at times placed "the issue of finance
reform at the top of the legislative agenda, in some cases prompting
significant legislative changes." 82
In later stages of judicial enforcement, courts have used "a variety of
techniques to enforce state constitutional socio-economic rights," like the
right to education.! Many have coupled "declaratory relief with on[]going
supervisory jurisdiction" in order "to 'cue' the political branches as to their
constitutional duties and then allow those actors time and a zone of
permissible discretion within which to meet their constitutional
responsibilities."l 84 Several legal scholars favor such enforcement to the
extent it facilitates an ongoing dialogue between the judiciary and
legislatures185

ometimes referred to as the "experimentalist approach" to

underscore that the resultant remedies are "provisional and subject to
continuous revision." 86
Declaratory relief and supervisory jurisdiction, so-called "weak
remedies,"'1 cannot be categorically rejected as insufficient to enforce
claim-rights. Experience shows that parties routinely obey declaratory
179.

Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary

Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1527 (2007).
180.

ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 170, at 118.

181. See id. at 118 ("Claims are therefore both distinct from and prior to remedies. Remedies are
only one stage in the fate of the duty.").
182. Rebell, supra note 179, at 1528.
183. See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and ConstitutionalSocio-Economic
Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 923, 963, 941-62 (2011).
184. Id. at 945.
185.

George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A FederalCourts Perspective on the State

School FinanceDecisions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 543, 546 (1994); Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers
and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive

Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1096-98 (1993); Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New
Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39

COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 351, 397-402 (2008); Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking JudicialActivism and
Restraint in State School Finance Litigation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 593-94, 598-600
(2004); Rebell, supra note 179, at 1539-42; Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1365-76 (1991).
186. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1016, 1019 (2004); see id at 1082-1110 ("The key characteristics of this
revised conception of professional decisionmaking are collaborative dialogue, provisionality, and
transparency . . . .").
187. See Tushnet, supra note 167, at 1910-11.
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judgments,188 leading some to observe that declaratory and injunctive
remedies "are rough substitutes" because there are few differences between
them when prospective relief is sought.1 89 The two significant differences
concern judicial management and timing.1 90 "If the court foresees a need
for heightened management of the parties, it should grant an injunction."1 9 1
Otherwise, "the declaratory judgment is preferable," particularly where it is
needed "at an earlier stage than the injunction" to "resolve legal uncertainty
in crossroads dilemmas."' 92
Those crossroads have been reached numerous times in school finance
cases "of first impression in which a state's high court is interpreting vague
and century-old state constitutional language."' 9 3 It cannot be said that the
courts' declaratory judgments defining the right to education as a claimright in these cases failed to enforce it as such. By giving content to the
states' duty, declaratory judgments in these contexts impose legal norms
more forcefully and directly than nominal claim-rights.1 94 And particularly
when the declaration is accompanied by a judicial finding that the state has
breached its duty, the judgment can be quite coercive despite the absence of
an immediate sanction for noncompliance. Indeed, in the eight states
Bauries cites as failing to conceptualize a claim-right to education because
the courts did not grant injunctions, the legislatures were nevertheless
spurred by the declaratory judgments to increase school funding. 95 One of
188. See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild DeclaratoryJudgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091,
1110-13 (2014) ("Over the past eighty years, the federal courts have issued thousands of declaratory
judgments, but the statutory authorization of further relief has been considered in published district
court opinions in only about seventy-five cases-less than one per year. And . .. the form of 'further
relief' that plaintiffs request from district courts more than any other is attorneys' fees." (footnote
omitted)).
189.

Id. at 1143; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 497 (2d ed.

1994) ("In practice, declaratory judgments that statutes are unconstitutional appear to have been as
effective as injunctions against enforcement."); MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON,
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 185-86

&

(2002) ("There is, in fact, little practical difference today between the two remedies, except that an
injunction can be immediately enforced while a declaratory judgment cannot be.").
190. See Bray, supra note 188, at 1124-43.
191. Id.at1144.
192. Id. at 1143-44.
193. William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Education Policy Reform
Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1226 (2004).
194. Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism,supra note 15, at 986 (suggesting that declaratory
judgments in school finance cases often "read like legislation").
195. See Mary J. Amos, DeRolph v. State: Who Really Won Ohio's School Funding Battle?, 30
CAP. U. L. REV. 153, 162-63 (2002); Erin E. Buzuvis, "A " for Effort: Evaluating Recent State
Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REv.
644, 674 (2001) (evaluating legislative responses in New Hampshire and Vermont); Molly A. Hunter,
Building on Judicial Intervention: The Redesign of School Facilities Funding in Arizona, 34 J.L.
EDUC. 173, 188-89 (2005); Robert C. Huntley, Public EducationSchool Funding Litigationin Idaho:A
Tale of Legislative Irresponsibility and Delay, 41 IDAHO L. REv. 247, 259 (2005); Erin E. Lawson,
Fulfilling the Promise of Education to South Carolina'sAt-Risk Children:A New PreschoolInitiative
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those states, Kentucky, passed what was described as "the most sweeping
education package ever conceived by a state Legislature" less than a year
after its high court declared the state in violation of the right to
education.196
Even so, the existence of a genuine claim-right should not hinge on
whether, and to what degree, the legislature acted in response to the court's
judgment, be it declaratory or injunctive. Legislatures have resisted full
compliance with both remedies.!9 In theory, courts possess inherent
powers to issue contempt citations for such disobedience.1 98 And the
Supreme Court of Washington has exercised that power, holding the state
in contempt and eventually imposing a $1 00,000-a-day fine when the
legislature failed to fulfill the constitutional mandate.1 99 Other courts have
reserved the option of closing public schools entirely until the legislature
complied. 2 00 But as one state supreme court justice somberly observed in
contemplating whether legislators could be held in contempt of the court's
school funding decisions, enforcement of a contempt order also "poses
in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2007); Hillary A. Wandler, Comment, Will Montana
Breathe Life into Its Positive Constitutional Right to Equal Educational Opportunity?, 65 MONT. L.
REv. 343, 364 (2004). This is not to say, of course, that the increases in school funding were sufficient
to satisfy the states' constitutional duties.
196. See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward:Public Engagement and EducationalReform in
Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 499 (1999) (quoting Edward B. Fiske, The Spring Report; Starting
Over, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at 34). "The Kentucky decision has been cited or relied on in nearly
every state education clause case since." Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at
984.
197. See Black, supra note 2, at 1388 & n.223 (observing that legislative responses to school
finance decisions are plagued by "unaccountability and unreliability"). See generally Joy Chia & Sarah
A. Seo, Battle of the Branches: The Separation of Powers Doctrine in State Education Funding Suits,
41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125 (2007).
198. See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) ("The ability to
punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means
to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REv. 735, 766-67
(2001).
199. See McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014) (order of contempt),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme Court News/84362-7 order - 9-ll-2014.pdf;
McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) (order imposing fine),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%2News/84362708131 SMcClear
yorder.pdf.
200. See Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634, 640 (Ariz. 1998) (staying injunction that would have
prevented state from distributing funds to the public school system to afford legislature time to comply
with decision); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976) (staying injunction that would have
enjoined public officials "from expending any funds for the support of any free public school");
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 499 (Tex. 1991) (staying
injunction to shut down the public school system to permit legislature to pass constitutional legislation);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewoodl), 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. 1989); Montoy v. State,
138 P.3d 755, 759 (Kan. 2006) (noting that court issued order to show cause directing the state to
explain why the court "should not enter an ORDER enjoining the expenditure and distribution of any
funds for the operation of Kansas schools pending the Legislature's compliance" with its constitutional
obligations).
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concerns" because a court "has no concrete powers like the sword
(executive) or the purse (legislative) with which to carry its judgments into
effect." 2 0 1 A contempt order might also run afoul of legislative immunity
and separation of powers principles.20 2
Bauries thinks that the potential for such inter-branch conflicts, which
he predicts "the legislature would likely win," means that "Hohfeldian
claim-rights to educational resources and services are unworkable, at least
where such claim-rights run against the state legislature to compel adequate
funding or resources."203 But such inter-branch tension inheres in the
adjudication of nearly every constitutional right; it is not unique to the
enforcement of the right to education.204 In fact, "federal courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, have tended to be reluctant not just to
accord broad structural remedies, but to accord any remedies at all in many
instances, even when federal constitutional and statutory rights have been
violated." 2 0 5 If constitutional rights have to be fully effectuated by all three
branches of government before they can take the form of a claim-right, then
there would be virtually no constitutional claim-rights.
At bottom, we have reasons to doubt Bauries's assertion that the right
to education takes the form of a claim-right in only six states where the
courts have both articulated it as such and ordered specific performance.
We can more readily accept his initial observation that the right to
education takes the form of a claim-right in nearly every state
constitution.206 Unlike Bauries, I believe that includes the thirteen states
where the claim-right is nominal either because the highest court has

201.

See DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St. 3d 309, 338, 2001-Ohio-1343, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1211

(Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive

Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 219 (1994)), vacated, 97 Ohio St. 3d 434, 2002-Ohio6750, 780 N.E.2d 529. As Bauries suggests, this perhaps "explains why no state court has gone so far as
to issue an injunctive order in a school finance suit and to follow through by using its traditional
contempt power when the order has been flouted by the state legislature." Bauries, Conceptual
Convergence, supra note 14, at 354-55.

202. See Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral:Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1082-83 (2006); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in PrisonReform, 13 BERKELEY

J. CRiM. L. 307, 314 (2008).
203.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 355 (emphasis added).

204. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalismand Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 398-99 (2007) (explaining that courts "limit[] majoritarian
decisionmaking . . . whenever they vindicate any constitutional right").
205. Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004); see Barry
Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing FederalRemedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738
(1992) (contending that "there is tremendous flexibility in the fit between right and remedy" in the
federal court system, "in which failure to comply with, if not outright defiance of, judicial remedial
orders is tolerated to a certain degree"); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOzo L. REV.
2081, 2113 (2005) ("Constitutional rights are systematically 'underenforced' by the judiciary, and for
excellent institutional reasons." (citing Sager, supra note 139)).
206.

See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 325.
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deemed it nonjusticiable 2 0 7 or because the court has yet to interpret the right
in a school funding case, though the text of the state constitution evinces a
Hohfeldian claim-right-duty correlation.20 8 With the possible exception of
Iowa and Indiana,2 09 the highest courts in the remaining thirty-five states
have all construed the right to education in the form of a genuine (i.e.,
judicially enforceable) claim-right, including the six identified by Bauries
that articulated a claim-right and ordered specific performance; 2 0 the eight
discounted by Bauries that articulated a claim-right but did not order
specific performance; 2 11 and the twenty-one whose high courts have
articulated a claim-right notwithstanding the outcome of the litigation or
whether the state fully complied with its constitutional duty thereafter.2 12
207. Courts in seven states have declined to entertain the merits of school finance litigation,
reasoning that their state constitution education clauses vest discretion in the legislature. See Ex parte

James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles,
680 So. 2d 400, 406-08 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190 (111.
1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 176 (Neb. 2007); Okla.
Educ. Ass'n v. State, 2007 OK 30, N 25, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066; Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d
110, 111-12 (Pa. 1999); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 42-43 (R.I. 1995).
208. As of this writing, the highest courts of six states-Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi,
Nevada, and Utah-have yet to decide a school finance case, and no case appears to be immediately
forthcoming. See NAT'L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).

But see Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Nev. 2003) (holding that issuance of writ of
mandamus was warranted directing legislature to proceed with special session to approve balanced
budget because, inter alia, legislature had failed to fulfill its constitutional mandate to fund education),
overruled in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339, 348 (Nev. 2006). Plaintiffs are pressing
challenges in New Mexico. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Martinez v. State, No.

D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.maldef.org/assets/pdf/
MartinezvNewMexicoComplaint04l14.pdf; Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
and Injunctive Relief to Bring New Mexico's Public Schools into Compliance with the Educational
Mandate of the New Mexico State Constitution, Yazzie v. State, D-101-CV-2014-02224 (N.M. 1st Jud.
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2015), http://nmpovertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Complaint-YazzieSecond-Amended-Complaint-2015-07-14.pdf.
209. See Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518, 520, 522 (Ind. 2009)
(acknowledging the General Assembly's "duty to provide for a general and uniform system of open
common schools without tuition" but concluding "that the Education Clause of the Indiana Constitution
does not impose upon government an affirmative duty to achieve any particular standard of resulting

educational quality" and thus "[t]o the extent that an individual student may have a right, entitlement, or
privilege to pursue public education, any such right derives from the enactments of the General
Assembly, not from the Indiana Constitution"); King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 21, 33 (Iowa 2012)
(declining to decide "whether plaintiffs' claims under the education clause present a nonjusticiable
political question" but observing that Iowa Constitution "does not mandate that the legislature provide
either 'free public schools' or an 'efficient system ofcommon schools').
210. See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 333-40 (discussing the decisions
of state courts in Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming).
211. See id. at 343-46 (discussing state court decisions in Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona).
212. See Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 402 (Alaska 1997);
Wells v. One2One Learning Found., 141 P.3d 225, 239 (Cal. 2006); Lobato ex rel. Lobato v. State, 218
P.3d 358, 372 (Colo. 2009); Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1276 (Conn. 1996); McDaniel v. Thomas,
285 S.E.2d 156, 164 (Ga. 1981); Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1213 (Kan. 2014); La. Ass'n of
Educators, 521 So. 2d at 394; Sch. Admin. Dist. No. I v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857
(Me. 1995); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. 1983); McDuffy v. Sec'y
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Note the overlap with the state courts that have construed the right to
education in the form of an immunity as well.213 As discussed in the next
section, rights can take the form of a combination of two or more
Hohfeldian incidents, depending on their function.
Figure A. Immunity-Claim-Right Forms Among the States.

Claim.dihtgg
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The Right to Education'sFunctions

All rights take the form of Hohfeldian incidents (power, privilege,
immunity, claim-right), but not all Hohfeldian incidents are rights.2 14 For
instance, we may have a "privilege not to assault others on the street[, b]ut
we would balk at saying that each of us has a legal right not to assault
others on the street." 2 15 A Hohfeldian incident qualifies as a right, then, if it
serves a function that "captures our ordinary understanding of what rights
there are and what significance rights have for rightholders." 2 16

of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 524 (Mass. 1993); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313
(Minn. 1993); Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 489 (Mo. 2009); Bismarck Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. I v. State ex rel. N.D. Legislative Assembly, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994); Pendleton
Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 200 P.3d 133, 139-40 (Or. 2009); Davis v. State, 2011 S.D. 51, 12, 804
N.W.2d 618, 623; Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 734 (Tenn. 1995); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138,
141-42 (Va. 1994); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (W. Va. 1979); Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI
93, 138, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 618, 614 N.W.2d 388, 404; Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Mich.
1972), vacated on other grounds, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973). But see LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d
246, 252 (Mich. App 2014) (suggesting state constitution "merely 'encourage[s]' education, but does
not mandate it" and directs responsibility for providing education to local school districts) appeal
denied sub nom. SS v. State, State Bd. of Educ., Dep't of Educ., 869 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. 2015).
213. See supra notes 111, 115-119 and accompanying text.
214. See Wenar, supra note 29, at 245.
215. Id. at 246.
216. See id. at 238.
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For centuries, the two main function theories have been will (or choice)
theory and interest (or benefit) theory.217 Will theory asserts that the
function of rights is to protect the autonomy of the rightholder by giving
her control over another person's duty. 2 18 Interest theory maintains that the
function of rights is to advance some of the rightholder's interests,
generally conceived as well-being. 21 9 The right to education illustrates why
neither theory has predominated.
Will theory cannot account for inalienable rights, like the right to
education.220 In keeping with the theory, A does not have control over B's
duty unless A possesses inter alia the power to waive B's duty.22 ' Children
cannot waive the state's duty to provide them an education.222 Hence,
according to will theory, there is no such thing as an inalienable right to
education-or any inalienable right (to life or liberty) for that matter. 223
Moreover, even if the right to education were alienable, it could not be held
by children because will theory insists that only competent adults, capable
of exercising a full range of autonomous choices, possess rights. 224 This
view simply does not fit with our ordinary understanding of children as
rightholders.22 5
Interest theory more plausibly explains the right to education's function
because "it can recognize as rights unwaivable claims" and "has no trouble
217. See id. at 223 & n.1 (citing A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS, supra note 22). The debate between
proponents of these two theories "stretches back through Bentham (an interest theorist) and Kant (a will
theorist) into the Dark Ages." Id at 238. Although this scholarly contest has been pursued with renewed
fervor in recent decades, it has effectively ended in a stalemate. Id. at 223 (citing L. W. SUMNER, THE
MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 51 (1987) (describing debate as "standoff")).
218. See Harel, supra note 96, at 194.
219. See id at 195-96.
220. See NEIL MACCORMICK, Children's Rights: A Test-Casefor Theories of Right, in LEGAL
RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154, 154-58 (1982);

Kramer, supra note 21, at 69-70.
221. See H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 183-84 (1982). In addition to the power to
waive, the rightholder must also possess the power to enforce the duty and the power to waive the
obligation to pay compensation for violation of the duty. Id.
222.

See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on

Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 155 (2008) ("[S]tate constitutional education obligations, like
other constitutional obligations with broad social purposes, are appropriately nonwaivable."); see also
Howard Klepper, Mandatory Rights and Compulsory Education, 15 LAW & PHIL. 149 (1996). To be
sure, parents or guardians can "waive" the state's duty to provide a publicly funded education to their
children, but the duty itself is not relinquished; it is merely assumed by the parent or guardian to pay for
private education or homeschool the child. Therefore, the right to education remains inalienable. Cf
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852-53 (1987) (explaining that
the different "meanings of inalienability share a common core: the notion of. . . an entitlement, right, or
attribute . . . that cannot be lost or extinguished").
223. See Harel, supra note 96, at 195-96.
224. See id.; Dailey, supra note 69, at 2100 n.3 (citing authors who have discussed the
application of will theory to the exclusion of children).
225. Some have contended that will theory's failure to conceive of children as rightholders
completely undercuts the theory. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21, at 69-70; MACCORMICK, supra note
220, at 154.
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viewing children . .. as rightholders, since children [also] have interests
that rights can protect., 22 6 Yet interest theory fails for another reason:
namely, that rights often advance the interests of others besides the
rightholder, raising doubts that the rightholder's interests are sufficient to
justify the right.2 2 7 "The right to free speech," for instance, "is often
ascribed to the speaker, or the potential speaker, but the justifications for
protecting it are often grounded in the interests of other persons, or even
the interests of the society as a whole."228
Such is the case with the right to education: the interests of children
advanced by providing them an education have not been sufficient to
ground the right. 22 9 Rather, the right to education is often justified as
necessary to preserve other rights of citizens and a republican form of
government as well as to sustain a market economy. 230 Even when courts
have seemingly invoked the intrinsic value of education in progressing a
226.
227.
228.

Wenar, supra note 29, at 241.
See Harel, supra note 96, at 194.
Id. at 196.

On Raz's variant of the interest theory the existence of a right turns not on the purpose of the

right's ascription, but on the sufficiency of the rightholder's interests in justifying the right's
normative impact ....

Yet this attempt to add the interests of the public to the interest of the

[rightholder] merely highlights the fact that the [rightholder's] interest is in itself insufficient
to ground this right.
Wenar, supra note 29, at 242 (footnote omitted); see also Gopal Sreenivasan, A Hybrid Theory of

&

Claim-Rights, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 266 (2005) (objecting to Raz's version of interest
theory because "it instrumentalizes the individual's status as right-holder ... [and thus] fails to take the
status of right-holder seriously enough" (footnote omitted)).
229. See Yuracko, supra note 222, at 154 ("[S]tate constitutional education obligations serve
social goals and purposes that go well beyond the interests of any individual child.").
230. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) ("We have repeatedly acknowledged the
overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship .... ); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 221 (1982) ("[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives to the benefit of us all."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("[S]ome
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence."); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. ... It is the
very foundation of good citizenship."); Yuracko, supra note 222, at 155 ("Courts interpreting these state
constitution clauses have similarly emphasized the democracy- and citizenship-promoting purposes of
the clauses as well as their importance for economic prosperity."); Weishart, supra note 30, at 520
n.237 (citing "courts favoring adequacy [that] have stressed the importance of preparing students to be
competitive in higher education and/or in the job market"); Eli Savit, Note, Can Courts Repair the
Crumbling Foundation of Good Citizenship? An Examination of PotentialLegal Challenges to Social

Studies Cutbacks in Public Schools, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1293-94 (2009) ("The education
provisions in Indiana and New Hampshire celebrate 'knowledge and learning' as 'essential to the
preservation of a free government,' while Idaho, Minnesota, and South Dakota's provisions declare that
the 'stability of a republican form of government' depends mainly on the 'intelligence of the people.'
Six other states' education provisions draw on John Adams's language in the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, and assert that the general diffusion of knowledge among the people is essential to
'the preservation of [their] rights and liberties.' Three more state provisions see an educated populace as
'necessary to good government.' And North Dakota's education provision makes the nexus between
democracy and education explicit . . . ." (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
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child's personal development, self-knowledge, and capacity to flourish, 231
they have suggested that these ends ultimately serve the common good.23 2
If children's interests are insufficient to justify the right to education, then
the interest theory also fails to fit with our ordinary understanding of the
right's function.
Leif Wenar contends that will and interest theories err in conceiving of
rights as serving only a single function, autonomy or well-being.233
Moreover, will and interest theories unacceptably limit the Hohfeldian
incidents that qualify as rights. Will theorists typically identify a right as
composed of a claim-right coupled with a power to decide whether to
waive or enforce the claim-right.234 Although interest theory potentially
could include the other Hohfeldian incidents (privilege and immunity), its
two leading theorists have defended it based on the notion that only claimrights qualify as rights. 2 35 Adhering to the view that rights should be
thought of "in the strictest sense" as claim-rights (or, at most, claims-rights
and powers) does not fit our ordinary understanding of rights taking the
form of important immunities (e.g., equal protection) and privileges (e.g.,
freedom to marry).236
Accordingly, Wenar proposes the "several functions theory," which
"holds that any [Hohfeldian] incident or combination of incidents is a right,
but only if it performs one or more of [these] six functions"-exemption,

231.

See Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State

Responsibilityfor EducationalFinance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281, 307
& nn.161-74 (citing, inter alia, Rose v. Council for Better Edue., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont
II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)).
232. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 ("Any system of common schools must be created and
maintained with the premise that education is absolutely vital to the present and to the future of our

Commonwealth."); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 524 ("The immediate purpose of the establishment of the
duty is the spreading of the opportunities and advantages of education throughout the people; the
ultimate end is the preservation of rights and liberties. Put otherwise, an educated people is viewed as
essential to the preservation of the entire constitutional plan: a free, sovereign, constitutional democratic

State."); Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359 ("These guidelines accord with our Constitution's emphasis on
educating our children to become free citizens on whom the [State] may rely to meet its needs and to

further its interests." (alteration in original) (quoting McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555)); Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94 ("Education plays a critical role in a free society. It must prepare our children to

participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system's survival.");
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 884 ("But the feature of the instrument that demonstrates most clearly the spirit
of enlightened patriotism and enlarged sense of genuine interest in the cause of humanity, was the

liberal provision for the establishment of a system of free schools." (quoting 1 W. Va. Preface)).
233.

Wenar, supranote 29, at 224.

234.
235.

See Cruft, supranote 53, at 367.
See id. at 370, 377.

236.

See Wenar, supra note 29, at 243 & n.36 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("It is only

philosophers of law who speak a 'strict' dialect of rights .... [And the only reason they do so] is to
rescue one of the single-function theories from counterexamples." (citation omitted)).
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discretion, authorization, protection, provision, and performance. 2 37 The
several functions theory accounts for the right to education better than will
and interest theories.
1.

For Children, no "Authorization," "Exemption," or "Discretion"

Hohfeldian powers and privileges are "active" in the sense that they
must be exercised by the rightholder and concern the rightholder's own
actions (signaled by statements like "A has a right to phi"). 238 Rights taking
the form of powers impart authorization"to alter the normative situation of
oneself or another" by creating, waiving, or annulling one's own or
another's claim-rights and privileges.23 9 In that sense, a "single power" is
nondiscretionary (e.g., A has right to annul B's privilege) while a "paired
power" is discretionary (e.g., A has right to create or annul B's
privilege).240
When a right takes the form of a privilege, it confers the rightholder
with one of two functions. In the case of a "single privilege," the function
is an "exemption from a general duty" (e.g., A owes B "no duty not[] to"
speak).24 1 In the case of a "paired privilege," like the paired power, the
function is "discretion, or choice, concerning some action" (e.g., A owes B
"no duty []not[] to" speak and A owes B "no duty .. . to" speak).242
None of the above functions properly describe children's right to
education. Children lack authorization to alter their own or anyone else's
claim-rights and privileges vis-A-vis public education, and they are not
exempt from the general duty to receive an education. Although parents
and guardians are afforded some discretion regarding the choice of public
or private education (assuming these options exist and are financially
available), that limited discretion also fails to fully capture the function of
the right to education that runs to children.
2. ForChildren, a Right of "Performance"and "Provision"
Hohfeldian claim-rights and immunities are "passive" in the sense that
they concern the actions of others and are enjoyed rather than exercised by
the rightholder (signaled by statements like "A has a right that B phi").243
237. Id. at 246.
238. See id at 233 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, "'phi' is an
active verb." Id. at 225.
239. Id. at 231.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 226.
242. Id. at 226-27.
243. Id. at 233 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rights taking the form of claim-rights denote functions of "protection
against harm or paternalism," 'provision in case of need," and "specific
performance of some agreed-upon, compensatory, or legally or
conventionally specified action."24 4 Immunities serve the same protection
function as claim-rights.2 45
That the right to education necessitates performance and provision is
generally uncontested. "In the legislative context," Bauries suggests that
the conduct that must be performed pursuant to the state's duty "is the act
of legislating" or "making policy" under the state education clause. 246 No
doubt perceived legislative inaction has incited school finance lawsuits and
prompted courts to intervene in response to either the initial challenge or
subsequent challenges after the state failed to comply with the court's
directives.247 But, as Bauries keenly observes, school finance challenges
"do not really go to legislative inaction" because, in fact, "legislatures have
acted"-they "have simply acted in ways that the plaintiffs claim [are
inadequate or] exceed the legislative discretion expressed or implied in the
education clause."248
Similarly, "every state constitution contains an education clause
mandating the provision of a free, public education," 249 and all states have
fulfilled that function by providing a free, public education system. So, "in
no case is any legislature accused of failing to provide for an education
system. Rather, each case presents a challenge to the legislature's decision
as to how much funding to provide and how to allocate it." 2 5 0 That
challenge turns on the degree to which the right to education serves the
protection function.
244. Id. at 229.
245. See id. at 232.
246.

Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 311. Presumably, in the executive

context, the conduct would be administering education policy (e.g., establishing a curriculum,
resourcing schools, teaching).
247.

See Jonathan Banks, Note, State ConstitutionalAnalyses of Public School FinanceReform

Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129, 154-55 (1992) (concluding that "frustration
with continual legislative inaction is implicit in virtually every [school finance] case" and that "[o]nly
when courts conclude that their legislature is unwilling or unable to pass effective remedial legislation
will they intervene"); see also Sonja Ralston Elder, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of
Powers, State Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 758 (2007) (examining "three
alternative court reactions to legislative inaction through the school financing experiences in Ohio and
New Jersey, in New York and North Carolina, and in Nevada").
248.

Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 351.

249. James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Forewordto Symposium on School FinanceLitigation:
Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 463, 466 (2004) (emphasis added).
But see Umpstead, supra note 231, at 289 n.20 (contending that "Iowa's constitution is the only state
constitution to make no provisions for educational responsibilities"); cf King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1,
14 (Iowa 2012) (observing that prior court precedent found that "no aspect of the Iowa Constitution,
including the education clause, authorized the legislature to provide for public schools (as opposed to
merely funding them)").
250. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 351.
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Table B. Wenar's Several Function Theory.

Passive

Active
Power

Authorization to alter the normative

I

Protectionagainst harm

Claim-Right

Protection against harm

situation of oneself or another

Privilege

Exemption from a general duty
Discretionconcerning some action

Provision in case of need
Performance of some

agreed-

upon compensatory or specified
action

3.

For Children, a Right of "Protection"

Despite the passage of more than forty years, there is still no definitive
answer to the question left undecided by Rodriguez: is there a federal
constitutional right to "some identifiable quantum of education"? 251
Rodriguez's successors-Plyler, Papasan, and Kadrmas-failed to settle
252
schlar
the matter,
as scholars as noted.253 Nevertheless, there should be no
doubt that, if there is a federal constitutional right to education, its principal
function is to protect children and, thereby, society at large.
The need to protect African-American children from the stigmatic
harms of discrimination precipitated the Court's declaration in Brown that
the right to education "must be made available to all on equal terms" and
its holding that state-imposed, racially segregated schooling is "inherently
unequal." 2 54 The Court's allusion to a right to education in Rodriguez came
by way of a response to the argument that "an opportunity to acquire []
251. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
252. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 224 (1982) (reiterating that "education is not a 'right'
granted to individuals by the Constitution" but applying heightened scrutiny to invalidate statute
denying public education to undocumented children as violative of the Equal Protection Clause);
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) ("As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet
definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal
protection review."). But see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) ("Nor have we
accepted the proposition that education is a 'fundamental right,' like equality of the franchise, which
should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual's access to it.").

253. See, e.g., Bitensky, supra note 6, at 567-73; Boyce, supra note 5, at 1050-51; Greenspahn,
supra note 12, at 769; Robinson, supra note 11, at 1683-84; James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and
Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1392-94 (2000); Emily Barbour, Note, Separate and Invisible:
Alternative EducationPrograms and Our EducationalRights, 50 B.C. L. REv. 197, 216 (2009).
254. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954); see Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 350-51

(1987). "In education cases following Brown, we see racial stigma being defined as a citizenship-like
harm, a matter of psychological harm, or both." R.A. Lenhardt, Understandingthe Mark: Race, Stigma,
and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 869-70, n.341 (2004) (citing cases).
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basic minimal skills [is] necessary" to protect "the enjoyment of the rights
of speech and of full participation in the political process." 2SS And, the
Court's invalidation of a statute denying a "basic" public education to
unauthorized immigrants was regarded in Plyler as vital to protecting those
children from the "social economic, intellectual, and psychological" harms
occasioned by absolute educational deprivation.25 6 The Court elaborated
that among the harms that should be averted were "[t]he stigma of
illiteracy" and the creation of a "subclass of illiterates" who would lack the
"ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions" and "surely
add[] to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime."25 7
Although emanating from state education rights and compulsory
attendance laws, the Court has also recognized that children possess
property and liberty interests in public education that must be protected by
258
the Due Process Clause. Again, the Court's concern was with the harms
associated with being deprived of an education, remarking that "total
exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period, [e.g.,
a suspension] for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended
child." 2 5 9

Taken together, the Court's decisions suggest that the federal
constitutional right to education, should it exist, at least takes the form of
an immunity against state-imposed racial segregation as well as a claimright to a "basic" public education that cannot be denied without due
process. This immunity-claim-right's function is to afford protection
against the harms of racial discrimination and educational deprivation.
The protection function is relatively more pronounced in the states that
have translated the right to education as a safeguard against the harms of
inequitable or inadequate distributions of educational opportunities.260
255. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. The Court accepted the State of Texas's assurances that it was
providing every child with "an adequate education." Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22. Social science research overwhelmingly confirms the Court's
reflection about the indispensable role of education in contemporary life. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER,
HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 1993); David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1801 (0. Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., 1999); THE SOCIAL BENEFITS
OF EDUCATION (Jere R. Behrman & Nevzer Stacey eds., 1997); Paul W. Kingston et al., Why Education

Matters, 76 Soc. EDUC. 53 (2003); Philip Oreopoulos & Kjell G. Salvanes, Priceless: The
Nonpecuniary Benefits of Schooling, 25 J. EcON. PERSP. 159, 160 (2011); Richard L. Wobbekind, On
the Importance ofEducation, 47 BUs. EcON. 90, 91 (2012).

257.
258.
259.

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223, 230.
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975).
Id. at 576; see Brent E. Troyan, Note, The Silent Treatment: Perpetual In-School

Suspension and the Education Rights ofStudents, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1637, 1645-46 (2003).
260.

Cf Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, CharterSchools, and Lessons To Be Learned, 64 FLA. L.

REv. 1723, 1777-78 (2012) (observing that state "courts have framed these cases in terms of how much
is at stake for disadvantaged students" and "in describing the long-term effects of inequitable and
inadequate education on society"); Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic
Education in Times ofFiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REv. 1855, 1866 (2012) ("Plaintiffs' success in
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Some courts stressed the latter; without equality of educational opportunity,
children are denied an equal chance to succeed in their education, in the job
market, and in their civic and social lives.261 Other courts, less convinced
that the right to education can or should afford equal life chances,
nevertheless insist that there should be adequate educational opportunities
such that children have an effective chance to succeed educationally,
economically, politically, and socially. 262
Notwithstanding this superficial rift between equality and adequacy,
courts adopting either standard (or both) essentially perceive the need to
protect children from being disadvantaged in life by disparities in
educational opportunity.26 3 And virtually all of the state courts that have
addressed it recognize that inequitable or inadequate distributions of
educational opportunity threaten the exercise and enjoyment of other
constitutional rights, productive and responsible citizenship, and an
efficient market economy. 264 Hence, by protecting children, the right to
education is also meant to protect the rights of everyone to benefit from and
participate in a democratic, capitalist society.
Yet despite its import, the protection function has been obfuscated in
the right to education's jurisprudence. Though it seems integral to the
Supreme Court's conception of a federal right to education, the Court
remains ambivalent about whether such a right even exists. What's more,
the putative federal right's protection function is largely inoperative as a
result of subsequent precedent that effectively ended desegregation
litigation26 and because arguably all states provide at least a "basic"
education.26 6 Moreover, unlike the right's performance and provision
these cases has been based on evidence that demonstrated a wide-spread pattern of inequities and
blatant educational inadequacies, primarily affecting low-income and minority students, in states
throughout the country.").
261. See, e.g., Serrano 1, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971) ("Unequal education, then, leads to
unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to participate in the social,
cultural, and political activity of our society.") (quoting S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. V. Johnson, 479 P.2d
669 (Cal. 1971))).
262. See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 428 (N.J. 1997) ("[A]
constitutionally adequate education has been defined as an education that will prepare public school
children for a meaningful role in society, one that will enable them to compete effectively in the
economy and to contribute and to participate as citizens and members of their communities.").
263. See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1223, 1237 (2008) (contending that courts in school finance cases "focus on disparities and seek to
ensure rough comparability" of resources and opportunities).
264. See sources cited supra note 232. Of special note, one court has construed its state
constitution's guarantee of equal educational opportunity to include a protection from the harms of
racial segregation-whether the product of de jure or de facto discrimination. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678
A.2d 1267, 1287-90 (Conn. 1996).
265. See Black, supra note 260, at 1732-38.
266. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1770 n.264 (2006)
("The debate over the citizenship-enabling aspects of education has been muted on a federal level by
the existence of state constitutional provisions.").
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functions, which are plainly expressed or implicit in the education clauses
of state constitutions, the protection function has been conveyed mainly
through judicial interpretations of those clauses, and often by deductioninferred from language in the clauses about the quality of education
required, e.g., "thorough," "efficient," "suitable," "adequate," "general,"
"uniform." 2 67 The protection function has also been unsettled as a result of
the equality and adequacy divide. Yet, as explored below, the protection
function actually serves to unite those doctrines.
C. Children'sRight to Education:An Immunity-Claim-Right with a
ProtectionFunction
Depending on who is regarded as the rightholder, the constitutional
right to education has taken the form of all four Hohfeldian incidents and at
least five of the six Wenarian functions.268 Courts have partially formulated
the right to education as a power held by the state, imparting authorization
to create, waive, or annul children's claim-rights and privileges within the
bounds of the Constitution. Courts have also formulated the right to
education as a privilege held by parents and guardians, conferring a
qualified discretion to elect a public or private education for their children
and to maintain some degree of control over their children's education.
Although power-authorization and privilege-discretion are essential
elements of the right to education, it is the sequence of the forms and
functions of the right held by children that transmits the right's distinctive
ethos.
As expressed in the text of state constitutions and construed by several
state courts, the right to education held by children takes the form of a
claim-right to the state's performance and provision of educational
opportunities. Owed to its status as a fundamental right in some states and
by judicial application of state equal protection guarantees, the right held
by children has also taken the form of an immunity. Note that the right to
education would be a fairly meager entitlement for children if the analysis
were to end there-if, as Bauries surmises, the right has been
operationalized primarily to satisfy the provision and performance
functions such that states simply have affirmative duties to provide an
267.

See Umpstead, supra note 231, at 290-91.

268.

Cf Randall Curren, Right to an Education, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY

AND PHILOSOPHY 712, 713 (D.C. Phillips ed. 2014) ("The universal right to free and compulsory
elementary education ... would be a constellation of privileges to take advantage of opportunities to
learn; claim on others (one's parents, government, and to some extent the international community) to
provide what is required for a suitable elementary education; immunity to others altering this privilege
and claim and no power to waive, annul, or transfer the right (making it inalienable); and no privilege to
not cooperate in learning opportunities others have a duty to provide (making the education
compulsory)."),
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education and to legislate, and that claim-right is paired with a modest
immunity, disabling only arbitrary legislative action.269
My analysis concludes that the right has more bite because of the
immunity-claim-right's shared protection function. As explained below, we
can perceive educational adequacy as the theoretical backbone of that
claim-right. Conversely, the immunity is linked by the principle of equality
of educational opportunity. The sum of these revelations expose the right to
education, not as a beautiful swan in the making but as a mutant of sorts;
and that may be a good thing.
II. EQUALITY AND ADEQUACY = EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS

The right to education invites controversy because it provokes
questions of distributive justice.2 70 Such questions lie at the heart of the
decades-long, equality-adequacy debate: does the right require equal
distributions of educational opportunities among all children or adequate
distributions such that children have access to a certain threshold of
educational opportunities? 271 Understandably, in this context, there is a
tendency to presume the right to education takes the form of a claim-right
and concentrate on its provision function.2 72 As a matter of principle, we
may think any provision of educational opportunities that is unequal is, a
fortiori, immoral. Or, we may find unequal provisions acceptable from a

269. Bauries thinks the right to education is better construed to impose fiduciary duties of loyalty
and due care on state legislatures. See Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 15, at 741-52. As such,
judicial enforcement should be directed not at "the specific adjectives contained in a state's education
clause but at the general goal these terms attempt to reflect-a system that educates the people as the
beneficiaries of a public educational trust." Id at 756. To that end, "courts should limit initial review to
process, rather than substance" and consider whether "the legislature has essentially abdicated its role
by failing to act at all in the face of obvious needs, or by acting without due care by failing to consider
relevant, material, and available information about the state's existing education system's needs and
flaws." Id at 762, 763. As Bauries concedes, "such a deferential approach will make plaintiff victories
significantly rarer," but he maintains "challenge[s] to an entire legislative scheme based on the
substantive terms of a state's education clause should meet a high burden." Id. at 763.
270.

See generally THE "INEQUALITY" CONTROVERSY: SCHOOLING AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

(Donald M. Levine & Mary Jo Bane eds., 1975).
271.
See Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 395-96 (2012); Michael Heise, Equal
Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An
EmpiricalPerspectiveand Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 545 (1998).
272. See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 303-304 & n.15 ("Much of the
scholarly work in existence focuses on the justiciability and remediability of 'education rights,' or on
the quantitative and qualitative entitlements that school children should have pursuant to the state
constitution's education clause."); Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under
State Constitutions when the FourteenthAmendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 108 (2008) ("We think it is fair to
construe [the education] clauses [in state constitutions in 1868] as in effect guaranteeing individuals a
right to some kind of government provision of a public-school education." (emphasis added)).
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moral standpoint provided that all children have enough educational
opportunities.
Apart from moral conviction, however, our sense of a just provision of
educational opportunities is frequently informed by beliefs about the kinds
of measures "necessary to protect children from unfairness in the
competition for postsecondary admission and jobs and from suffering
potential dignitary harms" on account of social inequalities. 273 That is,
when pressed to rationalize abstract notions of educational justice, we
speak in terms of the right to education's protection function. Indeed, as
previously observed, state courts have seemingly justified decisions finding
school finance schemes unconstitutional by explaining that equal or
adequate educational opportunities are essential to protectingchildren's life
chances, citizenship, and dignity and, in so doing, protect the rights,
benefits, and opportunities of everyone in a democratic capitalist society.
Although the protection function influences our sense of distributive
justice in education, it has not been the exact focus of much scholarly
attention, perhaps because it is so lofty, but more likely because it has been
obscured. If, as previously explained, Supreme Court precedent and the text
of state constitutions obfuscate the protection function, what grounds it in
the adjudication of the right to education? Without overtly addressing
protection as a distinct function, scholars have looked primarily to due
process and equal protection guarantees as sources for an implied right to
education in the U.S. Constitution or to reinforce the right's standing in
state constitutions. Other constitutional collaterals have been proposedthe First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, the implied right to vote, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Citizenship Clause, the Ninth
Amendment 27 4-but due process and equal protection are the two most
frequently nominated, and rightfully so. Together, liberty and equality
represent the values, norms, and interests that the right to education is
meant to protect.
A.

Liberty Through EducationalAdequacy

Taking the form of a privilege conferring parents and guardians
discretion over a limited range of choices (e.g., public versus private
education), the right to education secures liberty in a negative sense-

273. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in
EducationalLaw and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 611 (2006) (emphasis added); see
Enrich, supra note 13, at 167; Liu, supra note 7, at 345-46 (endorsing educational adequacy as essential
to ensuring children's citizenship rights and equal dignity).
274.

7.

See FARBER, supra note 8; Bitensky, supra note 6; Liu, supra note 7; Millonzi, supra note
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freedom from.275

But when the right takes its distinctive form as a claimright held by children, it functions to protect liberty in a positive sensefreedom to be.27 6 The link between education and positive liberty is most
palpable in state constitutions that express the right to education as a
safeguard of democracy.27 7 Several courts have so construed the right even
absent explicit language in the state constitution.2 78 The link is also implied
in Rodriguez and Plyler, as previously discussed.2 79 In either respect, the
notion is that education is part of the state's "formative project" in
cultivating children with capabilities to be responsible citizens who can
fortify their own liberties and, in turn, the liberties of others.2 80
Beyond education for citizenship, a few state constitutions explicitly
emphasize the economic importance of education to "commerce, trades,
as well as "vocational," 2 82 "mining,"283
manufactures"281
[and]
2 84
"agricultural,"
"scientific," 285 and "industrial"286 improvements. Where
state constitutions do not declare such purposes explicitly, courts have
explained that education is essential to preparing "students to compete for
and perform in their future career pursuits" and thereby "contribute to the
economy." 2 87 Again, the idea being that the state has some obligation to
275.

See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-22

(1969).
276. See id
277. See Savit, supra note 230, at 1293-94 (reciting language of fifteen state constitutions that
"endorse the view that education's importance is bound up in the participatory nature of democracy").
278. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (Ariz.
1994); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d
1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d
758, 785-86 (Md. 1983); McNair v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 288 P. 188, 190 (Mont. 1930); Robinson ex rel.
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655
N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997); Tenn. Small Sch.
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn. 1993); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 393 (Vt.
1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
877 (W. Va. 1979).
279. See supra Part I.B.3.
280.
See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 115 (2013); see also Foley, supra note 10, at 515-20; Areto A.

Imoukhuede, EducationRights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 469, 474-75, 480-81,
485-91 (2014); Liu, supra note 7, at 344-48.
281. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83.

§

282.

KAN. CONST. art. 6,

283.

NEV.CONST.art. 11,§ 1.

1.

284.

IND. CONST. art. 8,

§ 1;

NEV. CONST. art. 11,

§

1; see also MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V,

§ II;

N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83.
285.

IND. CONST. art. 8,

§

1; KAN. CONST. art. 6,

§ 1;

NEV. CONST. art, 11,

§ 1;

see also MASS.

CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83.
286. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; see also MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II.
287. Umpstead, supra note 231, at 308-09 & nn.175-85 (citing Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity,
662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont
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endow children with capabilities to be productive members of the
economy.2 88
Being the state's civilizing engine of democracy and catalyst for
economic efficiency, 8 9 education has instrumental value as a public or
collective good. 290 But courts adjudicating the right to education have also
recognized education's intrinsic value as a private, individual good that
should be enhanced by nurturing children's capabilities to be autonomous
development,
mutual
personal
and
moral
generally-through
understanding, self-knowledge, and the capacity to flourish in society.2 9 1
The nexus between education and positive liberty has been propagated
in decisions interpreting state constitutions to require educational adequacy.
In the most influential of those decisions, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
determined that an adequate education is one that instills "seven capacities"
enabling children to, inter alia, "function" in society, "make informed
choices" and "understand the issues" as responsible citizens, and "compete
favorably" in their education and the job market. 2 92 The Kentucky decision
has been "adopted or relied on in nearly every other successful state court
case for .. . two decades nationwide, regardless of differences in the
substantive language of the education clauses among the states."293
Given this emphasis on inculcating capacities or capabilities, scholars
inevitably noted educational adequacy's theoretical resemblance to the

II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 485, 487
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v.
State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)).
288. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.").
289. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting propositions that "some
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence [and that] education prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society").
290. See Derek W. Black, CharterSchools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 445, 448 n. 17 (2013) (referring to education as public or collective good in a non-economic sense
because in economic terms a public good is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable and "certain aspects of
education do not meet these criteria"); David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American
Struggle over EducationalGoals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39, 51 (1997).
291. See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877; Umpstead, supra note 231, at 307 & nn.161-74 (citing
Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 703
A.2d at 1359; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978)); see also Koski & Reich,
supra note 273, at 598 ("To be sure, education brings intrinsic benefits to the individual. Education is
an absolute, not positional, good insofar as those who have education gain more skills, capabilities, and
talents; they are better able to pursue their goals and make use of their freedom. Capabilities and talents
acquired through education are typically understood to be noncompetitive and non-zero sum."). See
generally HARRY BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 65-82, 121 (2000) (examining

"The Case for Autonomy-Facilitating Education" and "intrinsic benefits" of education); Kai M61ler,
Two Conceptions ofPositive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of ConstitutionalRights, 29
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 757 (2009).

292.
293.

Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
Bauries, EducationDuty, supranote 15, at 760.
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capability approach advanced by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.2 94
Positive liberty, the freedom to be (and to do), is central to that approach.
Sen describes capabilities as a person's "substantive freedoms"-i.e., real
opportunities-to achieve valued functionings ("beings and doings," e.g.,
being educated, being well nourished, having self-respect, voting, working,
taking part in the life of the community). 29 5 "At the heart of the [capability
approach] since its inception has been the importance of education," 296 as
both a basic capability (enhancing real opportunities to achieve) as well as
a valued functioning (an actual achievement in itself).297
Scholars endorsing the capability approach do not believe that justice
requires equal levels of functioning-for instance, "that everyone must
have [and achieve] the same education." 2 9 8 Rather, leading capability
theorists favor "equality for all in the space of capabilities" accomplished
by guaranteeing a minimum threshold of capabilities. 299 Hence, much like
proponents of educational adequacy, these capability theorists have as their
distributive rule some version of the sufficiency doctrine, emphasizing the
importance of ensuring capabilities up to a certain threshold but
presumptively negating the moral significance of inequalities above that
threshold.3 00

294.

See Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 482-83, 489-90; Liu, supra note 7, at 342, 346-47;

Lisa R. Pruitt, Human Rights and Development for India's Rural Remnant: A Capabilities-Based

Assessment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 844-46 (2011); see also Melanie Walker & Elaine
Unterhalter, The Capability Approach: Its Potential for Work in Education, in AMARTYA SEN'S
CAPABILITY APPROACH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EDUCATION 2 (2007); Madoka Saito, Amartya Sen's

CapabilityApproach to Education:A CriticalExploration, 37 J. PHIL. EDUC. 17 (2003).
295.
See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18, 75 (1999); AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39-40 (1992) thereinafter SEN, INEQUALITY]; Amartya Sen, Well-Being,

Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 169, 201-03 (1985).
296. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
152 (2011); see also SEN, INEQUALITY, supra note 295, at 44 (describing education as one of "a

&

relatively small number of centrally important" beings and doings that are crucial to well-being).
297. See Walker & Unterhalter, supra note 294, at 7; Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 482
n.97.
298.

Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Foreword: Constitutions and

Capabilities:"Perception"Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARv. L. REV. 5, 69 (2007).
299. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 316 (1999); see
Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, Children'sRights and a CapabilitiesApproach: The Question
of Special Priority, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 554 (2012) ("[Capabilities approach] is generally
committed to the equal protection of rights for all up to a certain minimum threshold."); Nussbaum,
supra note 298, at 69. "In grappling with requirements of adequacy versus equality of capabilities,
Nussbaum generally advocates only adequacy in relation to socioeconomic-type rights"; regarding
"education and health care, however, she suggests that 'adequacy does appear to require something
close to equality."' Pruitt, supra note 294, at 811 n.30 (quoting MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF

JUSTICE 294 (2006)).
300. See Weishart, supra note 30, at 512 (citing Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117
ETHICS 296, 297-98 (2007)).
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Surely the least objectionable construction of the right to education is
one that embraces this threshold account. 30 1 There is simply no denying
that education has "a constitutive presence, being central to enhancing
agency and autonomy, and in the contemporary world essential for
avoiding subjugation and exploitation by others."30 2 Thus, it takes no great
leap for courts to construe the right to education in the form of a claimright to at least an adequate education, one that functions to protect
children by instilling basic capabilities-real opportunities to achieve or
positive liberties that enable responsible citizenship, economic
productivity, personal development, and self-respect.
B. Equality Through Equal EducationalOpportunity
Taking the form of an immunity, the right to education has been
understood to protect against certain types of inequalities or inequities.
Brown's broad declaration that "the opportunity of an education .. . is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms,,30 3 initially held
the promise of advancing substantive equality of educational opportunity.
Yet, as mentioned, the Court's subsequent decisions narrowed Brown's
reach to forbid only de jure segregation, curbing the right to protect formal
equality-via an immunity against intentional, state-imposed, racial
discrimination.30 4
Following Rodriguez, the mantle fell to state courts adjudicating school
finance challenges to give further meaning to equal educational
opportunity. Early decisions retained the emphasis on securing formal
equality, immunizing children from discrimination based on the wealth of
the school district they happened to reside in. 3 05 The remedy for unequal
spending was "either horizontal equity among school districts, such that
per-pupil revenues were roughly equalized by the state, or at least fiscal
neutrality, such that the revenues available to a school district would not
depend solely on the property wealth of the school district." 3 06
As advocates and courts began to realize, however, there were two
main defects with equality as horizontal equity or fiscal neutrality: (1)
nothing prevented states from leveling down education spending overall to

301.

See Enrich, supranote 13, at 166-83.

302. TRISTAN MCCOWAN, EDUCATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT: PRINCIPLES FOR A UNIVERSAL
ENTITLEMENT TO LEARNING 62 (2013).

303. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
304. See Weishart, supra note 30, at 499.
305. See id. at 500.
306. William S. Koski & Jesse Hahnel, The Past, Present, and PossibleFutures of Educational
Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 41, 46

(Helen F. Ladd & Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015) (emphasis added).
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achieve it, and (2) it did not actually protect disadvantaged children who
required not equal but more spending to even approximate the educational
opportunities and attainment of their peers.30 7
Concurrent with legislative efforts to provide compensatory resources
and services to disadvantaged children, such as Title I, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, and the No Child Left Behind Act, state courts
gradually began to articulate a substantive brand of equal educational
opportunity, conferring an immunity against inequitable (as opposed to
unequal) spending.3 08 Vertical equity, as it is frequently termed in the
literature, is "a remedial school finance scheme that aims to mitigate
natural and social disadvantages by allocating greater resources to the
neediest students." 309 The motivating principle being that
all students should have an equal chance to succeed, with actual
observed success dependent on certain personal characteristics,
such as motivation, desire, effort, and to some extent
ability ... [and not] on circumstances outside the control of the
child, such as the financial position of the family, geographic
location, ethnic or racial identity, gender, and disability. 310
This principle of "equal life chances"-similar to Rawls's "fair
equality of opportunity" and later procured by contemporary luck
egalitarians-has maintained a hold on lawmakers, judges, and believers in
the American Dream.3 1 It bespeaks a sense of fairness about the proper
determinants for success in life 3 12 and, even more fundamentally, about
how to treat people with "equal concern and respect." 13 In that regard,
education is still seen as a "great equalizer," an instrument for leveling the
playing field.3 14
Although the principle of equal life chances enjoys broad appeal, it is
impossible to achieve. Equal chances for educational success cannot be
realized "without completely neutralizing all of the differential effects of
social circumstances (e.g., race, class, and gender) and natural endowments
307.
308.
309.
310.

See Weishart, supra note 30, at 501-04.
See id at 504-07.
Idat481.
Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School FinanceEquity: 1970 to the Present, in

EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 7, 13 (Helen F. Ladd et

al. eds., 1999).
311. See Weishart, supra note 30, at 485-86 & nn.33-35, 488-89, 495, 532.
312.

See JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 31 (1983) ("The

basic intuition is that it seems unfair that we should be able to predict eventual positions in a society
merely by knowing the strata into which children are born.").
313. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977).
314. HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT (1948), reprintedas END POVERTY THROUGH
EDUCATION (1848), in HORACE MANN ON THE CRISIS IN EDUCATION 119, 124 (Louis Filler ed., 1965).
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(innate talents and (dis)abilities) on every child's chances." 315 There are not
enough resources to accomplish such a feat, and even if there were,
chances for educational success would still be unequal so long as family
life remains a prevalent influence on a child's prospects-that is, so long as
parents retain the liberty to raise children in diverse ways.3 16
Although the underlying principle itself is practically infeasible, there
can be no denying the moral and political force of school policies that
promote greater vertical equity overall. 1 Allocating resources in an
attempt to at least mitigate natural and social disadvantages is fairer-and
shows more concern and respect-than ignoring or aggravating those
disadvantages, whereas failing to demand equitable educational
opportunities only serves to perpetuate political, economic, and social
inequalities that erode human dignity. Hence, several state courts have
construed the right to education in the form of an immunity that protects
children from the detrimental effects of inequitable distributions of
educational resources.
Despite the focus on resource equity in school finance litigation, for
many the notion of equal educational opportunity still signifies equality in
one important sense: racial and socioeconomic integration. Based on
extensive social science evidence, James Ryan, Derek Black, and other
scholars have urged school finance litigants to incorporate "an argument
that racial and socioeconomic integration are necessary components of a
student's constitutional right to an equal or adequate education."3 1 9 Alas,
"only a handful of advocates have even attempted" to make that argument,
which to date has prevailed in only one state court decision.3 2 0 Still,
scholars continue to argue persuasively that the social equality achieved
through integration is just as important, if not more important, than
resource equity to student achievement.

315. Weishart, supra note 30, at 532-33, 509-10.
316. See id.
317. Cf William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L. REv. 923, 927 (2011)
(book review) ("Further evidence of the coming-of-age of school-finance policy research and advocacy
is the agreement among the camps that additional educational resources must be allocated to students of
greater need and that school-finance formulas should account for those needs.").
318. See Weishart, supra note 30, at 505-06, 540 (discussing state court decisions employing
vertical equity principles); see also R. CRAIG WOOD, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANs-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 18 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that

school finance formulas in many states reflect attempts to incorporate both horizontal and vertical
equity).
319. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308 (1999); see Black,
supra note 271, at 374 n.9; 386 n.80 (citing other scholars who have advanced and examined the
implications of this argument).
320. See Black, supra note 271, at 375.
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"The InadequacyofEqual Protection"3 2 1

Judicially imposed limitations on federal equal protection guarantees
322
have received renewed attention in recent years.
Among the most
frequently criticized limitations are "the rigid tiers of scrutiny" and "the
requirement for a discriminatory purpose in order to prove
discrimination."32 3 State courts have contended with these limitations in
adjudicating equality-based school finance challenges.3 24
Most of the state courts in "lockstep" with federal equal protection
doctrine have applied "the rational basis/strict scrutiny dichotomy and
parrot[ed] the holdings of Rodriguez as to the non-fundamental nature of
education rights and the non-suspect nature of wealth-based
classifications."3 2 5 Others in lockstep have nevertheless "held that, under
their respective state constitutions, education is a fundamental right or
interest or that wealth is a suspect classification." 32 6 The few courts that
have diverged entirely from the federal approach have done so "in
counter[]intuitive ways." 327
Apart from the strictures of the federal doctrine, the inadequacy of
equal protection is evident in "the struggle of courts to resolve how the
concept of equality should be defined and measured"-and particularly
whether equal protection entails "formal and substantive equality." 32 8 This
struggle has persisted for decades in the school finance context, perplexing
scholars, courts, and legislatures alike.329 If equal protection demands
321.

Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" that Dare Not Speak Its

Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1907 (2004).
322.

See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection

Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 TermForeword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013); Tribe, supra note 321, at 1907-08; Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
323. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 322, at 1076; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481 (2004).
324. See Scott R. Bauries, Foreword: Rights, Remedies, and Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 703, 705 (2010)
("Thus, courts were asked to determine whether education was a fundamental right in the state, or

whether (real property) wealth was a suspect classification, on the way to deciding whether to apply
strict scrutiny to legislative decisions allocating educational resources unequally . . . ."); see also
Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School Finance: Is the Right to
Education the Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 358 (2011) ("Since lawmakers know
better than to employ racial classifications explicitly (or to reveal their discriminatory intent publicly), it
is hard to challenge school finance laws under a racial classification theory even if they produce
substantial racial inequalities.").
325. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 330.

326. Id. at 331.
327. Id. For instance, by "holding education to be a fundamental right but upholding their state
systems under strict scrutiny or (inexplicably) rational basis review." Id (footnote omitted).
328. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 322, at 1063-64.
329. See Enrich, supra note 13, at 144-55 (critiquing equality measures considered by courts and
legislatures); William S. Koski, OfFuzzy Standardsand Institutional Constraints:A Re-Examination of
the JurisprudentialHistory of EducationalFinanceReform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185,
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formal equality, then it "does not protect against inadequate funding,
provided that inadequacy is equally shared." 33 0 Nor does it require (as
opposed to permit) that education spending be adjusted to the needs of
differently situated children, 331 and thus it fails to protect those who need it
most.
If, however, equal protection demands substantive equality on the order
of vertical equity, then it poses implementation and management
problems. 3 32 "For once a court agrees to impose a remedy based upon
vertical equity, upon what basis should it rely to authorize or limit how
much more money a low-income school or student should receive than an
affluent one?"3 33 Answering that question seems to turn on "determining
what set of knowledge and skills schools should teach to each student" and
"what types of supplemental assistance students with special needs
require[] and how much that assistance will cost." 3 34

1203-11 (2003) (examining scholarship defining equal educational opportunity as horizontal equity,
vertical equity, "effective equality," and fiscal neutrality).
330. Darby & Levy, supranote 324, at 360; see also Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 498 ("The
primary weakness of the Equal Protection Clause as the Court is currently interpreting it, is that rights
may be violated, so long as they are violated equally.").
See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional
331.
Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 294 (2006) ("The Court
has never held that equal protection requires vertical equity .... ); see also Tico A. Almeida,

Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 22
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 525, 553 (2004) ("While normatively appealing, few courts have proven willing
to find a constitutional mandate for extra resources for the students with the greatest needs."). But see
Preston C. Green & Bruce D. Baker, Circumventing Rodriguez: Can Plaintiffs Use the Equal
Protection Clause to Challenge School FinanceDisparities Caused by Inequitable State Distribution

Policies?,7 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 141 (2002).
332. See Koski, supra note 329, at 1206; see also Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
273, 283 (N.J. 1973) ("We hesitate to turn this [school finance] case upon the State equal protection
clause. The reason is that the equal protection clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply
categorical answers in the vast area of human needs, choosing those which must be met and a single

basis upon which the State must act."); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1968)
(rejecting school finance challenge seeking vertical equity distributions based on children's needs
because it could not discern "'discoverable and manageable standards' by which a court can determine
when the Constitution is satisfied and when it is violated" (footnote omitted) (quoting Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557 (1964))).
333.

Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School Finance

Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REv. 1195, 1205 (2011); see also Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise
of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 891 (2006) (suggesting "obvious rejoinder" to
question of how much more spending vertical equity would require is "much, much more").

334. Ryan & Saunders, supra note 249, at 472; cf Helen F. Ladd, Reflections on Equity,
Adequacy, and Weighted Student Funding, 3 EDUC. FIN. & POL'Y 402, 411 (2008) (noting one of the
"thorny problems of implementation .. . is that the appropriate weights should in principle vary with the
outcome standard"); Robert K. Toutkoushian & Robert S. Michael, An Alternative Approach to

Measuring Horizontal and Vertical Equity in School Funding, 32 J. EDUC. FIN. 395, 397-98 (2007)
(observing limitation of vertical equity metrics is that some "do not have specific targets that can be
used to determine whether vertical equity has been reached").
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The Inequity ofDue Process

Substantive due process has also been sidelined by its elusiveness. 3 s
"Nearly fifty years after the Supreme Court revived the doctrine, its
historical origins and precise meaning-to say nothing of its relationship to
the constitutional text-remain as obscure as ever."33 In spite of, or
perhaps because of, its obscurity, the doctrine garnered renewed interest
following Lawrence v. Texas.337 Some commentators even suggested that
Lawrence illuminated a path toward the recognition of a federal right to
education.33 8 No doubt we can expect similar exploration following
Obergefell given the Court's reliance on substantive due process in
recognizing the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry.33 9
The notion that substantive due process underpins an affirmative,
liberty-based right to education is not new; it has been suggested for
decades.34 0 Substantive due process is triggered by state compulsory
education laws that restrict not only children's negative liberties 341 but
profoundly shape their positive liberties as well.34 2 Educational deprivation
causes "social economic, intellectual, and psychological" harms that may

335. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TouRO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999)
("There is no concept in American law that is more elusive or more controversial than substantive due
process.").

336. Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93 TEX.
L. REv. 275, 276 (2014) (footnote omitted).
337. Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We Want
To Be with the "Equalerty"of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOc. CHALLENGES 220,

316-17 (2010) ("Lawrence provoked a torrent of scholarship, a significant portion of which discussed
the liberty/equality analysis Justice Kennedy conducted under the substantive due process rubric."
(footnote omitted)); see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
338. See Brunell, supra note 10, at 345-46 ("Lawrence represents a sea change in the Court's
substantive due process analysis, and as a result, decisions such as ... Rodriguez are no longer on firm
footing."); Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 468 ("Ironically, Lawrence, which is a negative-rights and
liberty-based holding, can serve as the template for recognizing the positive right of access to public
education."); see also Note, A Right to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive

Due Process, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1323, 1327 (2007) ("[A]lthough substantive due process rests on a
shaky foundation, recent Supreme Court decisions not only have reaffirmed its legitimacy, but also
might have expanded its scope." (footnotes omitted)).
339. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599-2602 (2015).
340. See Bitensky, supra note 6, at 579-96; Gillespie, supra note 10, at 1018; Gershon M.
Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L.

REv. 777, 823-28 (1985).
341. See Ratner, supra note 340, at 824-25 ("State mandated school attendance laws deprive
students of their basic liberty interests in freedom of movement and freedom of association." (footnote
omitted)); Note, supra note 338, at 1330-31 ("Compulsory education laws infringe on a student's
undeniably broad liberty interests by precluding the student from pursuing activities that would
otherwise be possible and by forcing a certain type of instruction upon the student.").
342. Cf Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . .. to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, [and] to acquire useful knowledge . . . .").
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be fairly attributed to the state's denial of an adequate education.3 43 Under
federal substantive due process precedent, the threat of these state-created
dangers imposes an affirmative duty on states to protect children from such
harms.344 Alternatively, under another line of federal precedent, failing to
provide an adequate education bears no reasonable relation to the express
purpose of infringing children's liberty interests in order to educate them
and thus violates substantive due process. 34 5
Federal precedent aside, nothing of course "precludes the states from
interpreting [the substantive due process provisions ofj their own
constitutions to provide an affirmative state duty of protection."346
state courts have given substantive due process serious consideration.3 47 As
a basis for challenging educational disparities, it has been rejected in at
least two states.348 And, although it has been reserved as a potential basis
for a constitutional violation in other states, the predicates for such a
violation would have to be the absolute denial of a minimally adequate
education34 9 or arbitrary and capricious school funding distributions.3 so
Even if Lawrence and now Obergefell give the substantive due process
argument new tread, it is unlikely to gain much traction in education cases.
The problem with substantive due process is not that the doctrine itself is
too elusive or that the Court's precedents cannot support its application.
Ultimately, the problem vis-A-vis the right to education is that "substantive
due process decisions typically rest essentially or entirely on claims of

343. Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22, 252 (1982).
344. See Note, supra note 338, at 1333-34 (discussing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
345. See King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 66 (Iowa 2012) (Appel, J., dissenting); Note, supra note
338, at 1336-37 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
Robert Deichert, Note, Honoring the Social Compact: Arguing for A State Duty of
346.
Protection Underthe Connecticut Constitution, 33 CONN. L. REv. 1069, 1079 (2001).

347.

See David V. Abbott & Stephen M. Robinson, School FinanceLitigation: The Viability of

Bringing Suit in the Rhode Island Federal District Court, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 441, 478

(2000) ("Some plaintiffs have attempted to rely on substantive due process claims in school finance
cases, but so far with little success.").
348. See Lewis v. Spanolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 812 (Ill. 1999); King, 818 N.W.2d at 31-34; see
also Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 794 (R.I. 2014) (concluding complaint that
alleged inadequacies in school funding formula failed to present facts to demonstrate violation of
substantive due process).
349. See Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228, 235 (Kan. 2003); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v.
State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150 (Okla. 1987).
350. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (N.C. 1997); cf Citizens of Decatur for Equal
Educ. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 739 N.W.2d 742, 762 (Neb. 2007) (rejecting substantive due
process claim because appellants "failed to show that a heightened level of scrutiny applies to the
school district's decisions or that those decisions were not rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose").
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noncomparative right." 35 ' As the Court has put it: "'Due process'
emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the
State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in
treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are
arguably indistinguishable."3 52
Consequently, a liberty-based right to education grounded solely in
substantive due process could tolerate wide disparities in educational
opportunities among students provided that each individual student has
what the state deems to be an adequate share.353 Indeed, this is one of the
main criticisms leveled against adequacy-that, because it is, at least in
theory, not "comparative or relational,"3 54 it permits significant advantages
in the competition for college admissions and jobs (i.e., positional goods)
to be conferred on students who receive more than the adequate level of
educational opportunities.5 In short, adequacy encased in due process
licenses and exacerbates a great inequity.
E. Due Process and EqualProtectionfor the Right to Education
Much has been written about the erratic yet enduring relationship
between equality and liberty in the constitutional jurisprudence of equal
protection and substantive due process.3 56 Even more will be written
regarding their "synergy" given its professed significance to the Court's

351.

Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a ComparativeRight, 65 B.U. L. REv. 387, 478 (1985);

see also Raleigh Hannah Levine & Russell Pannier, Comparative and Noncomparative Justice: Some
Guidelinesfor ConstitutionalAdjudication, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 141, 147 (2005).

352.

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,609 (1974) (emphasis added).

353.

Cf Arthur E. Wise, Minimum EducationalAdequacy: Beyond School Finance Reform, 1 J.

EDUC. FIN. 468, 477 (1976) ("A substantive due process interpretation [of the right to education] would
mean only that protection needs to be provided up to a certain level.").

354.
355.

Koski & Reich, supra note 273, at 589.
See id at 607; Weishart, supra note 30, at 521-22.

356. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 73 (1996); David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and

Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1491 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal
Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183 (2000); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New
Jurisprudenceof Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due
Process, and the StereoscopicFourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 (2002); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99

(2007); Shuler, supra note 337; Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.

CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988); Tribe, supra note 321; Richard B. Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty
andEquality, 12 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182 (1955); Yoshino, supra note 322.
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reasoning in Obergefell.357 It may be counterproductive to expect one
direction-of-fit or elaborate theory that can account for all of the intricacies
and nuances of the evolving relationship between these doctrines, as the
Court itself seems to acknowledge in Obergefell.358 And yet the tortuous
saga of the right to education suggests that the makeshift bonds of liberty
and equality can fasten in the adjudication of a constitutional claim-rightimmunity imparting a protection function.
That function was the primary justification for state constitutional
rights to education 3 59 and has been the prevailing rationale for the putative
federal right to education. Although the latter was last given effect more
than thirty years ago in Plyler, the Court continues to express the
constitutional importance of protecting children from economic and
stigmatic harms, as it did most recently and prominently in Obergefell.6 e
Perhaps most importantly, the protection function theoretically links the
two strands of the right to education held by children-the claim-right to an
adequate education and the immunity of equal educational opportunity.
Separately, equality and adequacy as distributive principles have been
suboptimal in serving the protection function. 3 6 1 Together, they have made
more progress.362 Still, "it is difficult to find a consistent relationship
between [them] in the law [because] decisions in this area often are far
from models of clarity, and doctrines within a state can and do change over
time."36 3 Moreover, equality and adequacy intertwined can lose their
sustaining power in the face of legislative resistance and remaining doubts
about the judiciary's role in enforcing the right. 364 "At least three state
357. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
358. See id ("The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a
profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured
by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some
instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.").
359. See ZACKIN, supra note 169, at 72-73 (examining history of state constitutional education

provisions and observing that such provisions were often justified as means to protect children from
effects of poverty and to protect republican forms of government).

360. See 135 S.Ct. at 2600 ("A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education.").
361. See Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in

School Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1835, 1844 (2007) ("[N]either the equality nor the
adequacy 'wave' of litigation has produced the desired results even on the heels of ostensible judicial

victory." (footnote omitted)); Ryan, supra note 263, at 1229-30 (observing difficulties that equity and
adequacy decisions each present.).
362. See Jensen, supra note 13, at 27 ("[T]he largest group, in terms of sheer numbers of
successful plaintiffs [in school finance litigation], has used a hybrid [equality and adequacy]
approach.").
363.
Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL
PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 25, 31 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007).
See id. at 44 ("[T]he adequacy theory tends to stretch the limits of the institutional
364.

competence and power of courts that define adequacy as 'equity plus' by embroiling them in efforts to

974

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 67:4:915

supreme courts [adopting adequacy and vertical equity have] backed down
and accepted state actions (and inactions) that arguably fell short of both
adequacy and equity."36 5 In the final analysis, the difficulty lies in vague
education clauses in state constitutions that do not fix standards for
mutually enforcing equality and adequacy. 36 6
Pairing the right to education with either substantive due process or
equal protection separately would not yield acceptable standards. Equal
protection compelling vertical equity through the right to education's
immunity form would disable legislative actions that result in resource
inequities yet fail to impose any affirmative duty on the state to meet a
qualitative educational threshold. As previously discussed, a singular focus
on vertical equity would thus render the right to education an
unmanageable and inadequate protection.3 6 7 Indeed, in most states where
equal protection guarantees were deemed coextensive with the state
constitution's education clause and plaintiffs initially prevailed, courts have
since abandoned enforcement altogether3 68 or, more often, embraced the
need for a qualitative educational threshold, i.e., adequacy. 36 9
Conversely, substantive due process paired with the right to
define an 'adequate' education, to appraise the sufficiency of state measures to oversee and finance
local provision of such an education, and to force state legislatures to give a greater priority to
education than the legislators themselves would prefer."); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 248, at 472
("Expanding the remedy [of vertical equity and adequacy] risks diluting [their] impact by spreading
resources too thinly and thus compromising their effectiveness... . Defining what constitutes an
adequate education. . . [and] determining what types of supplemental assistance students with special
needs require ... [may] strain the competency of the courts.").
365. Briffault, supra note 363, at 46 (referencing Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Ohio); see also
Koski & Reich, supra note 273, at 570 ("[The vertical-equity-minded remedies of the Abbott litigation
[in New Jersey] have been only seldom and half-heartedly deployed in other cases.").
366.

See generally Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at 997 ("The

education clauses in state constitutions ...

constrain courts to a certain set of possible interpretations,

even though no state constitutional education clause appears to explicitly mandate a particular

conclusion as to the nature or the quantum of the educational entitlements it sets up."); Bauries,
Education Duty, supra note 15, at 729-31, 755, 762; Koski, supra note 317, at 932-33; Koski, supra
note 329; William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Years After
Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 789, 799 & n.30 (2009-2010).
367.

See DUNCAN MACRAE, JR. & JAMES WILDE, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS 66

(1979) (contending that vertical equity is difficult to apply because "[n]ot only do we have to identify
reasons for treating people unequally, but we must also decide how unequally they should be treated");
Koski, supra note 329, at 1206 ("As a judicial standard ... vertical equity would pose a serious
problem for manageability on a case-by-case basis."); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 249, at 476; supra
note 332-334 and accompanying text.
368. See ExparteJames, 836 So. 2d 813, 817-19 (Ala. 2002).
369. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002); Conn.
Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 227 (Conn. 2010); Neeley v. W. OrangeCove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005); State v. Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113, 121
(W.Va. 1988); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995). Courts in
California, Tennessee, and Vermont are the exception because they construed their equal protection
guarantees more in line with horizontal equity or fiscal neutrality than with vertical equity. See Serrano

v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 953 (Cal. 1976); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738
(Tenn. 1995); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390, 397 (Vt. 1997).
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education's claim-right form would impose an affirmative duty on the state
to meet a qualitative threshold yet otherwise tolerate resource inequities
and social inequalities. Again, as discussed, the noncomparative nature of
substantive due process would therefore abide and potentially magnify
educational disparities. 3 70 Although no appellate court has utilized
substantive due process in finding a violation of a state constitutional right
to education, the experience of state courts that have endorsed adequacy
suggests that at some point disregarding inequalities simply becomes
indefensible. Hence, courts have not enforced "some absolute notion of
adequacy, where disparities in resources are ignored" but rather have
demanded "substantial equality." 37
Coalesced within the right to education's immunity-claim-right
structure, substantive due process and equal protection together could
offset their respective limitations and ameliorate the right's enforcement
standards to synchronize the protection of children's liberty and equality
interests. Tethered to the right to education's claim-right form, substantive
due process exerts leverage in the demand for a qualitative adequacy
threshold-whether explicitly or implicitly required by the state
constitution or no372-to protect children's negative liberties (freedom
from educational deprivation) and positive liberties (freedom to be
responsible, productive, autonomous citizens). The substantive standards
could alleviate some of the manageability concerns by providing a
"baseline of adequacy"3 73 from which the vertical equity required by equal
protection can be measured and adjusted.374
370. See supra notes 353-354 and accompanying text; see also Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the
Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1001 n.98 (1979) ("[S]ubstantive due
process ... speaks to substantive liberties, without direct regard to the inequality of their distribution.");
Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 265, 281
(1987) (contending that inequalities perpetuated by economic substantive due process led to its demise).
371. Ryan, supra note 263, at 1237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
372. Cf Chris Lott, The Methodological Middle Ground: Finding an Adequacy Standard in
Alaska's Education Clause, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 73, 88 n.1 13 (2007) (observing that some states with
"the strongest education clauses have failed to find a constitutional standard of adequacy while other
states with weaker Education Clauses have found a constitutional promise of adequacy" (citation

omitted)).
373.
374.
81 MICH.
substance

Ryan & Saunders, supra note 249, at 472.
See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply,
L. REV. 604, 637 n.66 (1983) ("[S]tandards of substantive due process ... provide the
by which equalities and inequalities are determined."); see also Colleen Fahy, Education

Funding in Massachusetts: The Effects ofAid Modifications on Vertical and Horizontal Equity, 36 J.

EDUC. FIN. 217, 231 (2011) (noting that measuring vertical equity requires identifying spending targets
in relation to "the level of spending needed to insure adequacy for each student category [though
probably] the best that can be done is to measure a state's performance against its own goals"); Gloria
M. Rodriguez, Vertical Equity in School Finance and the Potential for Increasing School
Responsiveness to Student and StaffNeeds, 79 PEABODY J. EDUC. 7, 17 (2004) (suggesting that for

purposes of vertical equity "one possibility is to define educational need as the difference between
where students should be performing academically and the level at which they are currently performing
[or] assess the necessary structural and instructional changes required for students to access a common

Alabama Law Review

976

[Vol. 67:4:915

Equal protection, in turn, pivots the analysis to educational disparities.
First, it guarantees vertical equity in the distribution of educational
opportunities. As a result, equal protection will necessitate "funding to
compensate for differences in regional costs and student needs" and thus
"tend to focus disproportionate resources on [disadvantaged] students" to
afford them a meaningful opportunity to meet the adequacy threshold.37 5
Second, it intercedes when the disparities between children at the threshold
and children above it become objectionable. That is, when such disparities
imperil equal liberty by undermining children's capabilities "to function as
equal citizens and compete for admission to higher education and highquality jobs" on comparable terms.376 This would implicate both
substantive due process, requiring adequacy thresholds to be set higher to
diminish positional advantages held by those above the threshold, and
equal protection, requiring adjustments in the distribution of educational
opportunities to ensure vertical equity necessary to meet the higher
thresholds.37 7 In short, equal protection translates the adequacy required by
substantive due process into a relational or comparative demand.37 8
Hence, adjudicating the right to education "stereoscopically-through
the lenses of both [due process and equal protection]--can have synergistic
effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself 379 or that
the right to education can have unassisted.
Inasmuch as the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses
"further[] our understanding" of the "central precepts" of liberty and
equality entailed by the "right to marry,"380 they can do the same for the
right to education. It may be fair to characterize the resulting amalgamation
as an "equality-based and relationally situated theory of substantive
curriculum and foundational learning experiences"); Meaghan Field, Note, Justice as Fairness: The

Equitable Foundations of Adequacy Litigation, 12 SCHOLAR 403, 409 (2010) ("[I]n cases where the
resources were provided in full and educational equality remained out of reach, adequacy suits allow
plaintiffs to recalibrate the resources, measuring what is needed by how far the performance fell short of
equity and asking for more.").
375. Weishart, supra note 30, at 539-40 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf William S.
Koski, Achieving "Adequacy" in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 21-22 (2007) ("In
modern adequacy cases, the most evident manifestation of needs-based rights comes in the methods
used in costing-out an adequate education, that is, attaching a price tag to the resources necessary for all
children to reach specified educational outcomes."); Koski, supra 329, at 1235 (suggesting that when
"legislatures or courts talk about adequacy for a particular student or narrowly defined class of
students ... they [are] talking about what the student needs in order for the education to be adequate for
their needs").

376. Weishart, supra note 30, at 537-38.
377. Cf id at 534, 539-40.
378. Cf Ladd, supra note 334, at 416 (suggesting potential "compromise between equity and
adequacy. . . is to focus on adequacy as the primary goal, to permit some disparities above the adequate
level, but to limit the magnitude of those disparities, particularly those funded from public revenue");
Weishart, supra note 30, at 528.
379. Karlan, supra note 356, at 474.

380.

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-04 (2015).
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liberty.""' Or, to put it less eloquently, the right to education would remain
a mutant of sorts, an aberration in the constitutional order. Yet reconstituted
with its constitutional cognates, the right to education could be more
responsive, adaptive, and sustainable.
CONCLUSION

Irony is not argument, but it can have the same therapeutic effect. I
conclude with two ironies. First, had it not been for Rodriguez, the right to
education might never have been apprehended as a Hohfeldian claim-right.
That is, had the Court recognized a federal constitutional right to equal
educational opportunity implicating only the Equal Protection Clause, then
state courts likely would have similarly construed state rights to education
(assuming those courts had reason to interpret state constitutions at all
given the supremacy of the federal right). Hence, the right to education
held by children might have been formulated solely as an immunity.
Instead, Rodriguez prodded state courts to focus on the education
provisions in state constitutions and therein perceive the right in its form as
not only an immunity to equal educational opportunity but a claim-right to
an adequate education.
Second, rather than promote Brown as the standard-bearer for the right
to education, early state court advocates might have fared better parlaying
its oft-criticized companion, Bolling v. Sharpe,3 8 2 decided the same day.
Although it has been condemned as a politically contrived opinion,38 3 the
Court's conspicuous reflection in Bolling-that "the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
fairness, are not mutually exclusive" 384 -certainly bears scrutiny. The
question that remains, left unanswered by Obergefell, is precisely what

381.
Tribe, supra note 324, at 1898. Alexandra Natapoff perceived a version of this
amalgamation in an article addressing the underenforcement of criminal laws in urban areas. Natapoff
proposed that the right to education could serve as a model for dealing with the underenforcement
problem, observing that
the dual commands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as the
language of most state constitutions, have shaped the education debate into a dual inquiry of
adequacy and equality. The former represents a due process or minimal entitlements type of
challenge: Has the state provided an adequate minimum threshold of education? The second
is a comparative inquiry reflecting equality demands: Has the state provided equal access to
education as between jurisdictions or groups?
Natapoff, supra note 266, at 1769-70.
382. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
383. See Bernstein, supra note 356, at 1253, 1257-61.
384. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
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type of scrutiny. 8 Together, substantive due process and equal protection
guarantees can have synergistic effects, but precisely how they should be
balanced, if at all, in adjudicating the right to education bids further
research and consideration. 8 Nevertheless, I suspect that the lodestar for
the analysis is the right's protection function in securing children's liberty
and equality.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting majority opinion
385.
seemingly fails to follow "anything resembling [the] usual framework for deciding equal protection
cases," i.e., tiered scrutiny).
386.
See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the
ConstitutionalRight to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 442-44 (2000) (contending that
traditional substantive due process and equal protection analysis would be ill-suited for adjudicating
constitutional right to education and suggesting some alternatives).

